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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters.

Chapter 1 examines the effect of

transportation costs of shipping ethanol on retail gasoline prices over space. The
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) of 2007 legislated a new market into existence in the
U.S. by mandating that ethanol be blended with petroleum in retail gasoline markets.
Using a quantile difference-in-differences econometric approach to analyze weekly
retail gasoline price data for over 200 cities from 2007 to 2014, we find evidence that
the mandate differentially impacted gasoline prices across the U.S. Specifically, we find
that cities farther from ethanol production centers paid higher retail gasoline prices
than cities close to ethanol production centers. We argue that the observed retail
price differences are driven by market frictions associated with transportation costs
for ethanol which, unlike petroleum, cannot be shipped via pipeline. This effect has
been exacerbated due to the run-up in ethanol RIN (renewable identification numbers)
prices starting in 2013. Importantly, the effect of this market friction on retail gasoline
prices varies with the relative prices of ethanol and petroleum blendstock. Our results
highlight the spatial incidence associated with the mandated ethanol market. While
unanticipated, we argue that these market frictions are not surprising.
In Chapter 2 we investigate the forecasting performance of a variety of individual
models found in empirical literature and their linear combinations in the context of
carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions. We conduct out-of-sample forecasting exercise by
using state-level data for CO2 emissions in the U.S. Forecast error and tests of predictive
accuracy are compared both for individual models and their linear combinations.

v

Consistent with reported results on the application of forecast combinations, we show
that the forecast combination technique generally improves forecast accuracy. The
best performing combination outperforms all the individual models as the forecast
horizon increases. More importantly, forecast accuracy from the best performing
individual model is not significantly better than that of the best combination forecast.
Among the class of forecast combinations considered in this paper, bias-corrected
average forecast performs relatively well.
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Chapter 1
New Markets and New Market
Frictions: Evidence from Ethanol
and Retail Gasoline Prices
1.1

Introduction

Whenever policymakers pass a new regulation which either directly or indirectly
creates a market, there are often both intended and unintended consequences. The
unintended consequences of laws have received significant attention in the economics
literature recently (Goulder et al. (2012) and Bento et al. (2015)). However, one class
of unintended consequences due to new regulations that has received little attention
occurs when new regulation creates new market frictions.
Most generally, market frictions are transaction costs. For example, gravity models
in the trade literature show that increased distance between trade partners decrease
the volume of trade due to market frictions of increased transportation costs (Shepherd
(2012)). If new regulations create asymmetric transaction costs, then, new regulations
can create market frictions which differentially affect newly regulated agents. We
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argue that the passage of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) in 2007 in the United
States is one example.
RFS created a mandate that makes blenders of retail gasoline mix ethanol with
refined petroleum such that total ethanol consumed in the U.S. in a given year exceeds
some minimum level. The thousands of blenders have long existed and are distributed
widely throughout the U.S. serving to blend various additives to retail gasoline. The
mandate effectively forced them to blend ethanol into gasoline as well under penalty
of fine. This together with the concentration of ethanol production in the Midwest
created a market for transportation of ethanol to demand centers across the U.S.
Pipelines provide the cost-effective way to transport refined petroleum to and from
landlocked parts of the U.S. and transportation by rail and truck generally used only
for short distances (Borenstein and Kellogg (2014)). Due to lack of ethanol pipelines,
though, ethanol must be shipped via rail and truck throughout the U.S. Relative to
pipelines used for petroleum, then, shipping ethanol via these channels is more costly
than shipping petroleum due to higher transportation costs.1
To meet the RFS mandate, an obligated party can either purchase minimum
required volume of ethanol for blending into gasoline or buy Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs) in the market.2 The RFS was likely not binding for most of the
initial period of the mandate; more ethanol was produced than mandated. Before 2013
the price of corn ethanol RINs had been close to zero and, therefore, the RFS was
likely not binding during this period. In 2013 corn ethanol based RIN prices started
to increase, reaching about $1.00 per gallon in March 2013. Among the reasons cited
1

Though we do not study them here there is evidence that railroads exercise market power in the
transportation of ethanol by price discriminating based on environmental regulations at the route
destinations (Hughes (2011)). While we focus on the direct shipping aspect of transportation cost,
we note that transportation costs can come in many forms. As a result, our study is complementary
to this earlier work.
2
Once ethanol is produced, a serial number is assigned to a batch of ethanol to identify the type of
fuel and gallons of ethanol. Known as RINs, these unique numbers allow Environmental Protection
Agency to monitor compliance with the RFS. RINs are separated after they are initially sold and
can be traded in the open market. Obligated parties (refiners, blenders, and importers) fulfill the
mandate requirement by mixing at least the minimum required volume of biofuel, or, alternatively,
by purchasing enough RINs from the third parties.
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for the run-up in RIN prices for corn ethanol are rising RFS-mandated volumes and
the E10 (10% ethanol and 90% refined petroleum) ethanol blend wall.3
In this paper, we present evidence that the RFS created a market friction through
the transportation cost channel. We show that when RIN prices started to increase the
RFS mandate asymmetrically affected the retail price of gasoline throughout the U.S.
as a function of shipping distances. To do so, we constructed a comprehensive weekly
panel dataset of retail gasoline prices in over 200 U.S. cities. We combine that data
with weekly oil and ethanol price data. Importantly, the dataset includes different
measures of the distance between demand and supply centers of ethanol. We calculate
the shortest distances between cities and ethanol refineries as well as between cities
and ethanol production centers (i.e. Midwest). This allows us to explicitly control for
transportation costs associated with shipping ethanol by rail and truck to blending
stations in and around cities where retail gasoline is sold. In addition, there is a
debate whether positive ethanol RIN prices since 2013 contributed to rising gasoline
prices.4 We control for the higher RIN prices after 2013 in studying the distance effect
of ethanol shipping on retail gasoline prices.
We use quantile difference-in-differences estimator to test for the effect of the
distance market friction created by RFS on retail gasoline prices. There are three
main reasons for using a quantile regression rather than OLS technique. First, the
incentive to blend varies by wholesale petroleum price. As the relative price for
wholesale petroleum increases, the incentive for blenders to substitute ethanol for
petroleum increases. Since wholesale petroleum blendstock is the main input in
finished gasoline, the incentive to blend ethanol varies over the distribution of gasoline
prices. Specifically, blenders want to use higher ethanol blends when gasoline prices
are high. Therefore, conditional quantiles of retail gasoline price distribution can be
thought of representing the variation in blending decisions. Unlike the mean effect
3

See http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11671. Last accessed: May 10,
2015.
4
See http://ethanolrfa.org/page/-/rfa-association-site/studies/informa_gasoline_
price_analysis.pdf?nocdn=1. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
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from OLS, quantile regression method accounts for this substitution effect across the
retail gasoline price distribution. Second, we are interested in how the market frictions
created by the ethanol standard differentially affect gasoline prices over space. In
our quantile regressions, we allow for these frictions to vary differentially across both
different ethanol shipping distances and different retail gasoline prices. Third, refiner
profits (often proxied by the crack spread) vary with demand for gasoline. Ethanol
can have a differential effect on gasoline prices as demand rises and falls through the
refiner profits channel as ethanol reduces the market power of refiners during high
demand periods (Knittel and Smith (2015)). Quantile techniques account for this
asymmetric effect throughout the distribution of gasoline prices explicitly, while OLS
can only identify the mean effect.
We find that when RIN prices started to increase in 2013, cities farther from
ethanol production centers paid significantly higher retail gasoline prices relative to
cities nearer to production centers when relative oil and ethanol prices made blending
more profitable. This result follows from intuition expected from the incentives to
blend under a binding mandate: the mandate binds at the year level. However, within
a year blenders can choose to blend ethanol and petroleum only when it is profitable
to do so. It is profitable to blend ethanol in place of refined petroleum when the
price of petroleum is relatively higher than ethanol. The influence of this blending
decision on retail gasoline price is exacerbated when the ethanol must be shipped at
high cost far from production centers.5 Subject to standard difference-in-differences
identification assumptions, we take our results as causal evidence that the ethanol
regulation exacerbated the effect of market friction after 2013 which asymmetrically
affected retail gasoline prices in the U.S.
There is an important policy implication of our results. Regulation that creates
new markets should also account for the market frictions which emerge from setting
up that market in order to mitigate those effects. With RFS, our evidence suggests
5

When blending ethanol is expensive, blenders may purchase RINs in the open market or use their
own RINs banked in the previous year. We discuss the implications of this alternative compliance
avenue below.
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that the cost of accommodating this regulation to blenders varied over space. As a
result, the mandate’s stringency could have varied over space with the cost of the
market friction. Generally, this falls into a framework of accounting for the incidence
associated with creating a new market or regulatory framework (Bovenberg et al.
(2008)).
Our results contribute to two different areas in the economics literature. First,
there is a healthy debate in the literature about the effect of the ethanol mandate
on gasoline prices.6 These studies tend to use PADD (Petroleum Administration of
Defense Districts) level data (Du and Hayes (2009), Du and Hayes (2011) and Knittel
and Smith (2015)). Knittel and Smith (2015) makes the convincing claim that, overall,
the ethanol mandate has had little to no effect on average gasoline prices (∼ -10
cents). While we do not claim to identify the total effect of the ethanol mandate,
our quantile difference-in-differences design allows us to address the incidence of the
mandate across the U.S. at different levels of gasoline prices.7
Second, we contribute to the literature on how new regulations affect economic
activity in unintended ways (Dinardo and Lemieux (2001), Goulder et al. (2012) and
Bento et al. (2015)). We show that even in cases like RFS where there is a relatively
well-functioning market for satisfying the regulation, there can still be market frictions
created by a regulation which affect the incidence of the regulation.8 These market
frictions, in this case created by the lack of transportation infrastructure in ethanol
industry, affect the incidence of the policy. Policy makers should consider mitigating
those effects when new regulations create new markets.9
6

There is an additional question as to how substitutable ethanol and gasoline are for consumers
(Anderson (2012)). We are not able to address this question whatsoever. Although there is evidence
that ethanol and petroleum are imperfect substitutes, as long as consumer preferences within a city
are fixed over time our results are robust to this issue since we use city fixed effects in our econometric
model.
7
There is an additional question as to the non-market CO2 effects of the ethanol mandate due to
the interaction between land and fuel markets created by policy toward ethanol (Bento et al. (2015)).
We do not address this important policy question in this paper.
8
This is distinct from regulatory rents more generally Rose (1985).
9
There is new literature which discusses this in the context of spatial variation in the damages
from pollution by source (Fowlie and Muller (2013) and Carson and LaRiviere (2014)).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the economics
of ethanol blending and gives a background on ethanol mandate and transportation.
Section 1.3 describes data and the variables used in the paper. We present the
econometric specification in section 1.4. In section 1.5 we discuss the estimation
results. Then, we conduct robustness analysis of our empirical results in section 1.6.
Section 1.7 summarizes and concludes.

1.2

Ethanol Blending Economics and Background

This section provides a background for the ethanol industry in order to develop the
design of the empirical method. We describe the industry and the law first generally.
We then introduce how distance between ethanol refineries and demand centers can
act as a market friction due to relatively large transportation costs of shipping ethanol.

Renewable Fuel Standard
Initially, used as an octane booster and to meet air quality requirements, ethanol is now
an important input in transportation fuel.10 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required
increased use of ethanol by introducing Renewable Fuel Standard. It mandated use of
4 billion gallons of ethanol in 2006 and further increasing by 0.7 billion gallons each
year until 2012.
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 supplanted the 2005 RFS
and set mandated volumes through 2022 for total renewable fuels and various biofuel
subcategories from non-corn sources, including advanced biofuels, cellulosic biofuels,
and biomass-based diesel.11 While the updated RFS does not specify corn ethanol
mandate explicitly, ethanol derived from corn starch counts toward the non-advanced
10

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 lead local regulators to require use of oxygenated fuels
in all areas with the worst vehicle emissions that exceed the federal carbon monoxide air quality
standard.
11
EISA defines advanced biofuel as renewable fuel, other than ethanol derived from corn starch,
that would reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by 50%.
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biofuel portion of the total renewable fuel mandate. It mandates consumption of 9
billion gallons of renewable fuels in 2008, 20.5 billion gallons in 2015, and 36 billion
gallons by 2022. The implied volume of corn ethanol mandate is set at 9 billion gallons
in 2008 and is capped at 15 billion gallons in 2015 and thereafter. In this paper we
focus on corn ethanol because it makes up the vast majority of the RFS mandate and
the actual use of total renewable fuels in 2007-2014 sample period. To encourage the
use of renewable fuels, federal and state governments provide biofuel tax incentives
in addition to the mandate which penalizes lack of compliance. Federal blenders
tax credit, also known as volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEET), provided a
$0.51 credit ($0.45 since 2009) for every gallon of pure ethanol mixed with gasoline to
blenders of ethanol until 2012 when VEET was allowed to expire.
Figure 1.1 plots the production, consumption, and mandated levels of fuel ethanol
in the U.S. The 2005 RFS was not binding as the actual production and consumption
of ethanol was greater than the mandated quantity. This corresponds to a period
when the use of MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether), an oxygen additive, was banned
nationwide, effectively leading to an increased demand for ethanol to be used as
an oxygenate. Even when more stringent RFS of 2007 replaced the 2005 RFS, the
fuel ethanol production and consumption levels have generally been above the new
RFS-target levels until 2012-2013. Coupled with a RIN price of zero, we take this as
evidence that the RFS did not bind until 2013.
The price of a RIN is a better indicator of a binding mandate and its value is
determined by the difference between the supply and demand prices for ethanol. The
RIN prices will be zero if the equilibrium quantity of ethanol exceeds the mandate
and positive if the equilibrium quantity falls below the mandate. Before 2013 corn
ethanol RIN prices did not significantly deviate from zero.12 As the Figure 1.2 shows,
the situation was much different starting in 2013 when RIN prices increased sharply
12

See Figure 1 at http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/07/rins-gone-wild.html. Last
accessed: May 10, 2015.
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Figure 1.1: Fuel Ethanol Mandate, Production, and Consumption
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, October 2014;
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; Energy Policy Act of 2005.

Figure 1.2: Prices of Renewable Identification Numbers
Notes: D4, D5, and D6 represent historical RIN prices for biomass-based diesel (BBD or biodiesel),
advanced biofuel, and corn ethanol, respectively.
Source: The International Council on Clean Transportation.
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and have since stayed positive. The higher the RIN prices, the more costly it is to
meet the RFS mandate.13
There are at least three reasons why RIN prices increased in 2013. First, gasoline
consumption in the U.S. decreased relative to 2007 levels. When the RFS was enacted
into law, the mandated volumes of renewable fuels were based on projected gasoline
consumption in the U.S. Actual gasoline consumption was 135.5 billion gallons in 2013,
while in 2007 it was equal to 142.4 billion gallons.14 Second, as the RFS target levels
increased each year while gasoline consumption declined, certain PADD (Petroleum
Administration for Defense Districts) regions have reached ethanol saturation point.
Because of E10 blend wall, increasing the use of ethanol may require purchasing RINs
in the open market. Third, continued increase in ethanol consumption under the
RFS coupled with lower gasoline consumption and E10 blend wall will eventually
require investment in infrastructure that can handle higher ethanol blends. As a result,
blending ethanol has become more expensive in the sense that blenders must still need
to meet their renewable obligations under the RFS. In the past obligated parties had
generally used more ethanol and banked the excess RINs when blending ethanol was
profitable.15 However, as the mandated volumes of fuel ethanol increased and more
and more blenders reached E10 blend wall, they started drawing down their stocks
of RINs.16 This together with the anticipation of continued future decline in RIN
inventories contributed to rising RIN prices in 2013.
Introduction of gasoline with greater than 10% ethanol content in the market has
generally been slow due to lack of infrastructure. Even though in 2011 EPA allowed
E15 (gasoline with up to 15% ethanol content) for use in light-duty motor vehicle
models of 2001 and later, it is not widely available and is mainly sold in some of the
13
EPA announced in November, 2013 that it expected to cut the ethanol consumption obligations
to 13 billion gallons for 2014, a reduction of 1.4 billion gallons from the mandated level. The EPA’s
proposal is aimed to keep the ethanol blend share close to 10%.
14
U.S. EIA Short Term Energy Outlook, November 12, 2014.
15
The RFS regulations allow the obligated parties to use banked RINs toward up to 20% of the
their current year obligations.
16
See http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/04/rin-stocks-part-1-valuation.html.
Last accessed: May 10, 2015.

9

Midwestern states. Similarly, market penetration of flex-fuel vehicles capable of using
E85 (gasoline with up to 85% ethanol content) has been lower than expected.17
Positive RIN prices might also be due to transaction costs and speculative
components. The anecdotal evidence suggests that some market participants in
the RIN market are purchasing RINs when the prices are low and selling RINs for a
premium when the prices are high. Given the opacity of RIN market, we are not able
to assess how much of the ethanol RIN price spikes might be due to the speculative
activity (if any) in the RIN market.

Transportation of Ethanol
Distance plays a significant role in explaining price differentials across locations where
markets are not completely integrated (Engel and Rogers (1996)). With respect to
the ethanol mandate, distance between ethanol refineries and blending terminals
could act as a market friction due to lack of infrastructure in the ethanol industry.
Infrastructure for efficient movement of ethanol from the production centers in the
Midwest to population centers on the coasts is lacking, and spatial variation in
infrastructure development and ethanol plant location will have a significant effect on
ethanol shipping costs (Das et al. (2010)).
Ethanol production is concentrated mainly in the Midwest, closer to corn growing
counties in the Corn Belt. This is not surprising given that corn is the main feedstock
in corn ethanol and hauling corn is more expensive. Nevertheless, ethanol is shipped
throughout the U.S. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of ethanol plants, blending
terminals, and corn production by county in the United States as of 2011.18 Blending
terminals are distributed across the U.S. closer to demand centers. Consequently,
as the Figure 1.4 shows, there is a geographical variation in how quickly ethanol
17

Consumption of E85 fuels was equivalent to 137.2 million gasoline gallon equivalent for 2011, which
is only 1% of total ethanol consumed in the U.S. in 2011. See http://www.eia.gov/renewable/
afv/index.cfm. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
18
Ethanol plant locations are taken from the Renewable Fuels Association, corn data - from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture 2009 yields data, and active fuel terminal locations - from the Internal
Revenue Service.
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Figure 1.3: Location of Corn Growing Counties, Biorefineries, and Gasoline
Terminals

Figure 1.4: Ethanol Blend Share for Selected Years (%)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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penetrated different markets. Before the RFS was made into law, ethanol was the
main oxygenate additive in finished gasoline in the Midwest (panel i). However, when
the use of MTBE was phased out nationwide by 2006, ethanol emerged as a primary
fuel oxygenate component in other states as well (panel ii). With the more stringent
2007 RFS, ethanol usage increased throughout the U.S., although for the first few years
most of the additional ethanol had been absorbed in the Midwest (panel iii). This is
as expected as most ethanol refineries are located close to the Corn Belt. In addition,
Midwestern states could utilize more ethanol because they already had necessary
infrastructure in place before the federal mandate became a law. However, as the
RFS requires greater ethanol consumption in the subsequent years, additional ethanol
has to be absorbed elsewhere, specifically East and West Coasts where the gasoline
consumption is much higher than the other regions in the U.S. (panel iv). Because
more ethanol has to be shipped to other regions that are farther from the Midwest,
this likely implied greater cost to blenders there due to higher ethanol transport
costs. As ethanol consumption increased, certain PADD regions have reached the
10% ethanol blend share. For example, ethanol blend share in PADD 1 and PADD
2 regions has been around 10% since 2009 (see Figure 1.5), which likely meant that
additional ethanol had to be shipped to other PADD regions.19
In addition to the ethanol shipping distance, per gallon transportation costs are
greater for ethanol than for petroleum due to the mode of transportation (Morrow
et al. (2006)). Ethanol produced in the Midwest is transported via barges (5%),
trucks (29%), and rail (66%) to wholesale terminals near population centers (USDOE
(2010).) While barges are the cost effective way to transport ethanol, ethanol is
shipped by more expensive means, mainly by rail for longer distances and by trucks
for shorter distances. Shipping ethanol by pipelines is virtually nonexistent. A 2010
study by the U.S. Department of Energy found construction of separate ethanol
pipelines from the Midwest to the East Coast to be economically not viable at current
19

The share of ethanol in total finished gasoline can be above 10% without actually reaching the
blend wall if consumption of E15 and E85 fuels is present in the market. However, the consumption
of E85 is more prevalent only in upper Midwest due to the availability of E85 infrastructure there.
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Figure 1.5: Ethanol Blend Share by PADD Regions

Notes: Ethanol blend share in PADD 1 and PADD 2 regions has been around 10% since 2009. As
the RFS mandated volumes are expected to increase further, other PADD regions are likely to see
increased ethanol consumption soon.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

ethanol consumption projections.20 Furthermore, existing petroleum pipelines used to
transport petroleum products cannot be used in shipping ethanol because the water
found in low level pipelines causes ethanol to separate from gasoline and mix with
water. Therefore, unlike other petroleum additives, ethanol cannot be mixed into
gasoline at refineries to be shipped via existing pipelines. Consequently, because of
these factors and infrastructure bottlenecks in the ethanol industry, shipping ethanol
can be relatively more expensive. Physically transporting ethanol to the East and
West Coasts costs at least $0.13 per gallon and to regional markets it costs about
$0.07 per gallon (Coltrain (2001)). These numbers are in 2001 prices and are likely a
lower bound. Hughes (2011) found that railroads have market power in the ethanol
shipment and price discriminate based on environmental regulations at destination
points (e.g. carbon monoxide non-attainment areas). In addition, shipping via rails
sometimes proved problematic due to rail transportation constraints. In the past, cold
weather and increased crude oil shipments were blamed for causing rail traffic to back
up in the Midwest, leading to an increase in premium for ethanol in New York relative
to the price in Chicago from $0.25 (January, 2014) to $1.0 a gallon (February, 2014).21
While at blending terminals, ethanol is kept in separate tanks underground and
then splash blended with motor gasoline to the desired level before being delivered to
retail gasoline stations. The minimum quantity of ethanol required to be blended is a
yearly volume regulated by RFS.22 The maximum amount of ethanol to be blended is
10% in volume. Blenders make decisions to blend ethanol that must meet or exceed
the mandated amount. The exact amount of ethanol content depends on several
20

There are a few places where ethanol is shipped by pipelines (for example, in Florida). These
are typically short pipelines and the volumes of ethanol shipments are small. See http://www.afdc.
energy.gov/pdfs/km_cfpl_ethanol_pipeline_fact_sheet.pdf. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
21
See, for example, The Wall Street Journal articles available here http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303546204579439740561525518 and here http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303847804579479643372241358. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
22
This is a unique feature of the regulatory structure for ethanol: the mandated level of ethanol to
be blended is an absolute yearly volume rather than a percent of total retail gasoline consumed. This
is a useful aspect of the policy for our study: a volumetric mandate permits blenders to have more
flexibility to choosing their blending strategy within a year as opposed to a percentage requirement.
A percentage requirement implies that as the quantity demanded of gasoline fluctuates within a year,
blenders would have to respond more quickly.
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factors, such as the mandate, local and state regulations, relative prices of ethanol
and petroleum blendstock, seasonal oxygenation regulations, and reid-vapor pressure
(RVP).23 Some studies found blending at 10% ethanol and 90% gasoline blendstock,
known as E10, to be more prevalent in the corn-growing locations than places far
from such feedstocks (Walls et al. (2011)). Underdeveloped ethanol infrastructure and
the cost of transporting ethanol from geographically remote ethanol refineries in the
Midwest to blending terminals across the U.S. limit the ability of blenders at far away
places to take advantage of low cost ethanol during high oil price periods. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that the cost of frictions in this newly created market (e.g.
ethanol delivery and logistics) heterogeneously affects retail gasoline prices over space.
Our primary goal in this study is to estimate how the ethanol mandate affects retail
gasoline prices across space due to market frictions (e.g. transportation costs).24 The
wholesale price of refined petroleum is in large part driven by oil prices and refiners’
ability to exercise market power. The price of ethanol is largely driven by the price of
corn and how mandated levels of ethanol interact with capacity constraints of refiners.
However, as noted below we are concerned with blenders’ decisions. As a result, our
identifying assumption is that the capacity of gasoline supply is constant over the
2007-2014 sample period considered in this paper. This implies that changes in the
gasoline price are totally driven by demand shifts and that retail gasoline blenders are
price takers.
23

For example, because ethanol increases RVP, petroleum blendstock may be optimized so that
after mixing with ethanol RVP does not exceed the established standards.
24
As noted before, a related question is how the ethanol mandate affected average gasoline
prices across the United States. Proponents of biofuel policy argue that ethanol blending reduces
energy prices. For example, recently Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack wrote that “use of ethanol
... suppresses gas costs by as much as $1.37 a gallon.” (See http://www.ethanolproducer.
com/articles/8922/vilsack-biofuels-can-continue-to-lower-consumer-gas-prices. Last
accessed: May 10, 2015). These estimates are based on a study by Du and Hayes (2009) and their
subsequent studies in 2011 and 2012. Du and Hayes estimate the relationship between ethanol
production and the profit margin for oil refiners. These studies found that ethanol production lowered
gasoline prices by 89 cents in 2010 and $1.09 in 2011. Knittel and Smith (2015) show that these
results are likely driven by spurious correlations. Knittel and Smith (2015) find that the effects of
ethanol production on gasoline prices are near zero and statistically insignificant.
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1.3

Data

Our objective in this paper is to present evidence that the RFS asymmetrically affected
the retail price of gasoline throughout the U.S. as a function of shipping distances. We
use a panel dataset of weekly prices from January, 2007 to July, 2014 that spans preand post-U.S. binding ethanol mandate. All price data are converted to July, 2014
U.S. dollars using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index (CPI) for
urban consumers. We focus on contiguous U.S. by excluding observations for states
Alaska and Hawaii. The dataset includes data for 208 cities from 35 states that are
widely distributed throughout the U.S.
This paper analyzes data collected from a variety of sources. For retail gasoline
prices, we use wholesale rack prices of unbranded gasoline with up to 10% ethanol
paid by retailers. Retail gasoline prices are given by cities across the U.S. and are
taken from Bloomberg databases. Corn ethanol prices are weekly average prices at
Iowa ethanol plants and are obtained from Agricultural Marketing Resource Center
at Iowa State University. By using ethanol prices at Iowa plants we assume that the
production price of ethanol is set in the Midwest ethanol market.25
The price of crude oil is used as a proxy for petroleum blendstock. We use PADDlevel crude oil spot prices with delivery points within those PADD regions.26 We
use PADD-level prices because of substantial divergence between Brent and WTI
(West Texas Intermediate) crude oil prices beginning in 2011. For PADD 2 region, we
use WTI crude oil spot price for Cushing, Oklahoma, for PADD 3 - Light Louisiana
sweet crude oil price with delivery point in St.James, Louisiana. However, we lack
PADD-level prices for PADD 1 and PADD 5 regions. Instead, for PADD 1 region
we use weekly Brent oil prices because PADD 1 region refines oil imported mainly
25
USEPA (2010) uses ethanol spot price on Chicago Board of Trade and adjusts for transportation
costs to deliver ethanol from the Midwest to end use terminals. Because Iowa is the the largest
ethanol producing state, and ethanol produced in Iowa is no different from ethanol produced in other
Midwestern states, it is reasonable to use Iowa ethanol prices.
26
By using the oil price directly we assume that there is no variation in refinery profits. However,
as long as variations in oil refinery profits are uniformly distributed across the United States to all
blenders this problem amounts to measurement error in the price of oil variable.
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from abroad as well as domestically produced oil. Though, in recent years, East
Coast refiners have been reducing imported crude oil and increasing domestic crude oil
thanks to increased domestic crude oil production and its lower cost.27 As for PADD
5 region, we use Alaska North Slope crude oil spot price because the region refines oil
imported from Alaska, in addition to oil produced in California. Additional regression
results without PADD 1 and PADD 5 regions are presented as well. We matched the
PADD-level oil prices with states and cities located within those PADD regions. A
barrel of oil is equivalent to 42 gallons and we divide the oil price by 42 to get per
gallon price. Crude oil price data are taken from Bloomberg databases.
Since ethanol prices vary across regional markets due to transportation costs, we
use distance from ethanol plants to destination points to proxy for ethanol shipping
costs. Ethanol is first delivered to blending terminals, there blended with petroleum,
and then delivered to gasoline stations. Since blending terminals are located in and
around cities, we use distance from ethanol plants to cities, instead of from ethanol
plants to blending terminals to cities. Importantly, we use different measures of
distances between demand and supply centers of ethanol. This allows us to explicitly
control for transportation costs associated with shipping ethanol via rail and truck
to blending terminals in and around cities where retail gasoline is sold. We find
the shortest distances between cities and ethanol refineries as well as between cities
and ethanol production center in the Midwest. We define the ethanol production
center as the geometric center of six Midwestern states where the vast majority of
ethanol is produced. The largest ethanol producing states are Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois,
Minnesota, Indiana, and South Dakota. These states accounted for about 75 percent
of the domestic ethanol production over the sample period.28 The next largest ethanol
producing states, Ohio and Wisconsin, each expected to produce one-half the amount
of the smallest of the six largest ethanol producing states in 2014. The centroid of
these six states, which we define as the ethanol production center in the Midwest,
27

See EIA article at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21092. Last accessed:
May 10, 2015.
28
Renewable Fuels Association: Ethanol Industry Outlook for 2007 through 2014.
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falls within the boundaries of the state of Iowa, the largest ethanol producing state.
We find the shortest distance (in thousands of miles) from each city to the ethanol
production center in the Midwest using great-circle distance.
For the shortest distance from each city to ethanol refineries, we use weighted
average distance from each city to the nearest ethanol refineries. Because most ethanol
plants are small-scale producers, using distance to the single nearest ethanol plant
would likely underestimate the distance effect on gasoline prices. However, since
ethanol can still come from these smaller ethanol producing plants, we experimented
with alternative measures of distance, such as the weighted average distances from
cities to the closest four to eight ethanol refineries. We discuss these measures of
distance in the robustness checks below.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample period that is the basis of
this study. The distance from cities to the ethanol production center in the Midwest
ranges from 26 miles up to around 1,450 miles. For the sample period, PADD-level
oil prices ranged from low $30 to a high of $162 per barrel. In per gallon terms,
PADD-level oil prices ranged from $0.72 to $3.85 with a standard deviation of $0.47.
Per gallon cost of corn ethanol at Iowa plants ranged from $1.56 to $3.15 with a
standard deviation of $0.38. The blender’s decision to mix ethanol into finished
gasoline depends on the relative prices of ethanol and petroleum blendstock. The
existence of market friction in ethanol transportation may change the competitiveness
of ethanol to blenders, especially for those that are farther away from the Midwest.
The price spike in the delivery price of ethanol in early 2014 due to back up in rail
traffic is one example of the existence of market friction in the ethanol market.
Several states have their own renewable fuel programs. Some of these programs
predate federal ethanol mandates. Table 1.2 presents a list of six states that have
statewide oxygenate mandates. For example, in Minnesota all gasoline must contain
at least 10% ethanol, but blends with at least 9.2% of pure ethanol (e.g. excluding
denaturants and other permitted components) by volume are considered to be in
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Unit

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Distance

1,000 miles

0.68

0.34

0.03

1.45

Retail gasoline price

U.S.$ per gal.

2.70

0.50

0.95

5.31

PADD-level oil price

U.S.$ per gallon

2.35

0.47

0.72

3.85

WTI oil price

U.S.$ per gallon

2.24

0.41

0.87

3.75

Ethanol price

U.S.$ per gal.

2.27

0.38

1.56

3.15

Notes: The data is for 208 U.S. cities covering January, 2007-July, 2014. Distance is
the great circle distance from cities to ethanol production center in the Midwest. Retail
gasoline price is the wholesale rack price of unbranded gasoline with up to 10% ethanol
paid by retailers. All price data are deflated into July, 2014 U.S. dollars.

Table 1.2: State Ethanol Mandates
State

Ethanol in Gasoline ( %)

Effective Date

Florida

9 to 10

Dec 21, 2010

Hawaii

10

1994

9.2 to 10

2003

Missouri

10

Jan 1, 2008

Oregon

10

Nov 1, 2009

2 to 10

Dec 1, 2008

Minnesota

Washington

Source: Weaver et al. (2010); U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center.
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compliance.29 Hawaii, Minnesota, Missouri, and Oregon require that gasoline contain
at least 10% ethanol in volume. Because we are also interested in potential impacts of
blending ethanol above the required standard on gasoline prices, we experiment by
excluding the cities within those states.

1.4

Econometric Model

The geographically remote locations of biorefineries coupled with the underdeveloped
ethanol infrastructure created a market for ethanol transport. Due to the mode of
transportation and underdeveloped infrastructure, shipping ethanol is more expensive.
When the RIN prices started to increase in 2013, blending ethanol at farther away
places from the Corn Belt have likely occurred at greater costs. We investigate the
effects of higher transportation costs of ethanol on retail gasoline prices over space
after the RFS policy started binding in 2013. To do so we use a research design
which is a very specific form of difference-in-differences design. Similar to Kiel and
McClain (1995), we consider a continuous treatment, which is distance from a city
to the ethanol production center in the Midwest. Kiel and McClain (1995) used
direct distance from the house to a new garbage incinerator to study the effect an
incinerator had on housing values. In our model we consider a similar framework
where transportation costs of shipping ethanol increases with distance from a city to
ethanol sources. We control for when the policy started binding, not when the policy
was passed in 2007. If the corn ethanol RIN prices before 2013 were essentially zero,
they sharply increased starting in 2013. As the Figure 1.2 shows, the value of ethanol
RINs skyrocketed from about 5 cents at the end of 2012 to approximately $1.50 by
July of 2013. While the price of RINs since came down, it is nowhere close to pre-2013
levels. The value of RINs affects blender’s choice of compliance method. For example,
when the RIN price increases it encourage blending ethanol because purchasing RINs
29

See https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=239.791. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
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increase the cost of gasoline production.30 This explains why we are using 2013 as a
reference year rather than 2007.
Our identification relies on the assumption that changes in gasoline prices are
driven by demand shifts and, therefore, supply capacity is assumed to be constant
during the study period. We estimate difference-in-differences quantile regression
specification with continuous distance treatment effect discussed above. This modeling
is identical to a standard difference-in-differences strategy with the only difference
that the treatment is continuous. There is a great deal of variability in distance
measure as our dataset includes cities distributed throughout the U.S. while ethanol
production is concentrated in the Midwest. We control for when the mandate started
binding nationally. The dataset covering 2007-2014 includes period when the policy
was binding (2013-2014) and when the policy was not binding (2007-2012).
The literature on quantile regression shows that it has been applied in various
settings. For instance, the technique has been used in studying the impact of welfare
reform on earnings (Bitler and Hoynes, 2006), returns to education (Arias et al.,
2001), birthweight determinants (Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008). Our quantile differencein-differences method applies the difference-in-differences approach to each quantile of
the data instead of mean. There are three main reasons for using a quantile regression
rather than OLS technique. First, the incentive to blend varies by the relative prices
of wholesale petroleum and ethanol. Since finished gasoline is at least 90% petroleum,
the incentive to blend ethanol varies over the distribution of gasoline prices. Therefore,
conditional quantiles of retail gasoline price distribution can be thought of representing
the substitution effect in blending decisions. In contrast, OLS estimates the mean
effect and cannot account for this substitution effect arising from dynamic market
incentives. Second, in our quantile regressions we allow for the market frictions to
vary differentially across both different ethanol shipping distances and different retail
gasoline prices. Third, refiner profits (often proxied by the crack spread) vary with
30

Reuters article reported that higher RIN prices cost refiners at least
$1.35
billion
in
2013.
See
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/
us-rins-spike-costs-analysis-idUSBREA2U0PT20140331. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
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demand for gasoline. Ethanol can have a differential effect on gasoline prices as
demand rises and falls through the refiner profits channel as ethanol reduces the
market power of refiners during high demand periods (Knittel and Smith (2015)).
Quantile techniques account for this asymmetric effect throughout the distribution of
gasoline prices explicitly, while OLS can only identify the mean effect.
The main empirical specification regresses the retail gasoline price on the relative
prices of oil and corn ethanol, and distance variables:
Pgit = γ0,τ + γ1,τ 1 · {Y r > 2012} + γ2,τ (Pet −Pot ) + γ3,τ Pot + γ4,τ 1 · {Y r > 2012}×Disti
+ γ5,τ (Pet − Pot ) × Disti + γ6,τ 1 · {Y r > 2012} × (Pet − Pot )
+ γ7,τ 1 · {Y r > 2012} × (Pet − Pot ) × Disti + λi,τ + fmy,τ + it,τ

(1.1)

Pgit = x0it βτ + λi,τ + fmy,τ + it,τ

(1.2)

Qτ (τ,it |xit , λi,τ , fmy,τ ) = 0

(1.3)

Qτ (Pgit |xit , λi,τ , fmy,τ ) = x0it βτ + λi,τ + fmy,τ

(1.4)

where the dependent variable, Pgit , is retail gasoline price for city i in week t, x is
our vector of regressors, and βτ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Pet is the
weekly corn ethanol price, Pot is the weekly price of a gallon of oil, Disti is the distance
from city i to the ethanol production center in the Midwest, and it,τ is the error term
with unknown distribution function and potential heteroskedasticity.31 We estimate
the relationship of x with Pgit for different values of τ which indexes the quantiles
of the dependent variable. Thus, Qτ (Pgit |xit , λi,τ , fmy,τ ) denotes the τ th conditional
quantile of Pgit with 0 < τ < 1. Estimation and inference of βτ is discussed in Galvao
(2011). It is clear that the advantage of using a panel data (rather than cross sectional)
quantile regression is that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity in the gasoline
prices.
31

Quantile regression is a semiparametric method because one does not need to specify the
distribution function of the error term. The presence of heteroskedasticity is captured by the quantile
regression coefficients. See Koenker (2005) for further details.
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λi,τ control for city fixed effects. At the local level blender’s decision to operate
depends on the costs of its inputs, such as petroleum blendstock, ethanol, labor costs,
etc. City fixed effects control for local unobserved production costs, variations in local
environmental policies, and differences in local regulations. For example, Brown et al.
(2008) finds that there are significant spatial differences in regulation and that those
differences significantly affect gasoline prices.32 In addition, some states require how
the information about the ethanol content be labeled in retail outlets.
fmy,τ are month-by-year effects, where m is month (January-December) and y is
year (2007-2014). Month-by-year effects, fmy,τ , are monthly dummies for each year of
the data sample. In other words, every month in a certain year is allowed to have a
different impact from the same month in a different year.33 They control for everything
that was fixed within that time period and remove all of the fluctuations common
across states and PADDs over time. For example, month-by-year effects control for
variations driven by national level events as well as variations due to seasonality.
Note that both city fixed effects and month-by-year effects are τ -dependent. With
large number of city fixed effects, it is typical to impose the restriction λi,τ = λi for
all quantiles. These traditional city-specific effects (λi ) do not vary across quantiles
and they estimate a location-shift effect that simply shifts the conditional quantile
functions by λ.
The justification for the inclusion of relative prices of ethanol and oil in the
regression is straightforward.

We assume that ethanol is a substitute, though

imperfectly, for petroleum blendstock. The incentive to blend ethanol is greater
when the ethanol price and its associated transportation costs are smaller than the
petroleum blendstock. As a result, we include not only the oil price as a control
variable, but also the relative prices of corn ethanol and oil: (Pet − Pot ). To make the
interpretation of coefficients easier, we normalize the (Pet −Pot ) variable by subtracting
32
To the extent that there is seasonal variation in these regulations, we assume that seasonal
variation in regulations are orthogonal to distance from ethanol refineries.
33
Given the weekly observations, we determine the corresponding calendar month the weeks belong
to generate month-by-year effects.
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from it its post-2012 mean value. Identification for this coefficient comes from weekly
variations in ethanol and PADD-level oil prices.
Disti is distance from city i to ethanol sources and controls for ethanol
transportation costs. Ethanol produced in a particular city (state) is no different from
ethanol produced in other city (state). Because ethanol production is concentrated
in the Midwest, our distance measure is the distance from each city to the ethanol
production center in the Midwest. We find the centroid of the six largest ethanol
producing states and designate it as the ethanol production center. The centroid of
these ethanol producing states corresponds to a location in Iowa, which also happens
to be the largest ethanol producing state. However, since ethanol still comes from
other places, a blender will minimize its costs of production by purchasing ethanol
from the closest ethanol refineries provided supply of ethanol is available. As will
be discussed in the next section, we also present results using alternative measures
of distance, such as the weighted average distances from cities to closest ethanol
refineries.
We are mainly interested in the effects of distance on gasoline prices after 2012
when the ethanol policy started to bind. Hence, the coefficients of interest are those
on (Y r > 2012)×Dist and (Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×Dist. From equation 1.1, if we take
the derivative of retail gasoline price with respect to distance we get
∂Pg
∂Dist

= γ4 + γ7 (Pet − Pot )

(1.5)

Y r>2012

This is the overall impact of distance on gasoline prices, where γ4 is the direct
distance effect. The interpretation of equation 1.5 is similar to “trade cost” in gravity
models of trade. In the gravity models of trade, distance between two countries reduces
the volume of trade between them. In our model, cost of ethanol to blenders increases
with distance which is captured by γ4 . As the mandate started to bind and RIN prices
started to increase in 2013, more ethanol has to be shipped to places outside the
Midwest. To see the relationship between retail gasoline price and ethanol shipping
24
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Figure 1.6: Relationship of Gasoline Price with Distance
Notes: Distance measure the distance from cities to ethanol production center in the Midwest. We
bin the distances into several intervals of the same size and plot the average value of the gasoline
price for each distance bin.

distance, we plot them in Figure 1.6. Note that distance is great circle distance from
cities to the centroid of the largest ethanol producing states in the Midwest. Since we
have thousands of observations, simple scatter plot would have become overcrowded
and, therefore, not very useful in studying the relationship between the two variables.
Therefore, in the Figure 1.6 we bin the distance variable into several intervals of the
same size and plot the average value of the gasoline price for each distance bin. From
the figure we can see a positive relationship between the two variables. However, as
the equation 1.5 makes clear the effect of distance on gasoline prices also depends on
the relative prices of corn ethanol and petroleum blendstock. We discuss the overall
effect of distance on gasoline prices below.
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Table 1.3: Main Regression Results

(Y r>2012)

(0.10)
1.068∗∗∗
(87.50)

(0.25)
1.014∗∗∗
(88.97)

(0.50)
0.981∗∗∗
(66.41)

(0.75)
0.954∗∗∗
(62.76)

(0.90)
1.007∗∗∗
(61.37)

(Pe −Po )

0.197∗∗∗
(28.57)

0.166∗∗∗
(28.31)

0.143∗∗∗
(19.33)

0.0751∗∗∗
(9.85)

0.0739∗∗∗
(9.02)

Po

0.393∗∗∗
(62.43)

0.386∗∗∗
(69.73)

0.376∗∗∗
(55.27)

0.326∗∗∗
(45.58)

0.296∗∗∗
(38.07)

(Y r>2012)×Dist

0.0164∗∗∗
(4.64)

0.0129∗∗∗
(3.95)

0.00545
(1.32)

-0.0137∗∗
(-3.27)

-0.0404∗∗∗
(-9.17)

(Pe −Po )×Dist

-0.0187∗∗∗
(-4.37)

-0.0389∗∗∗
(-9.82)

-0.0524∗∗∗
(-10.05)

-0.0670∗∗∗
(-11.95)

-0.0614∗∗∗
(-9.50)

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe − Po )

-0.0557∗∗∗
(-5.38)

-0.0269∗∗
(-2.98)

0.0165
(1.51)

0.171∗∗∗
(15.82)

0.249∗∗∗
(21.73)

(Y r>2012)×(Pe−Po )×Dist

-0.0430∗∗∗
(-3.99)

-0.0508∗∗∗
(-5.37)

-0.0830∗∗∗
(-7.14)

-0.154∗∗∗
(-13.01)

-0.261∗∗∗
(-20.04)

0.801∗∗∗
(31.92)

0.885∗∗∗
(39.51)

1.043∗∗∗
(36.37)

1.275∗∗∗
(42.84)

1.396∗∗∗
(43.85)

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Constant

City fixed effects
Month-by-year effects
N

t statistics in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

1.5

Results

Table 1.3 presents the regression results for different quantiles of retail gasoline price
distribution. We are mainly interested in distance effect on retail gasoline prices after
2012. The coefficient on (Y r > 2012)×Dist is positive for τ < 0.75. This means that
ethanol shipping distance had positive impact on retail gasoline prices after 2012 when
the RIN prices started to increase. However, this effect is statistically significant only
at the lower tails of retail gasoline price distribution (τ < 0.50). Thus, when retail
gasoline price is low, cities farther from the ethanol production centers in the Midwest
26

paid significantly higher gasoline prices than cities in upper Midwest. As the mandate
became binding at the national level starting in 2013, more ethanol has to be shipped
to far away places. Therefore, blending in those places may have occurred at higher
costs due to the binding mandate and ethanol transportation costs. This result is
intuitively clear: because E10 market in the Midwest has been saturated with ethanol,
additional ethanol consumption due to the mandate must have come from places that
have not yet hit the blend wall. This is because, even though the RFS is a national
mandate, the penetration of ethanol across the U.S. has not been uniform. Figures
1.4 and 1.5 both suggest that the Gulf Coast, Rocky Mountain Region, and to some
degree the West Coast likely absorbed more ethanol when the mandate started binding.
Even if blenders choose not to blend ethanol to the required minimum level, a binding
mandate means that blenders in far away places would have to pay significantly higher
prices for RINs to meet their renewable volume obligations. RIN is a variable cost
that increases the cost of producing finished gasoline. If a blender chooses not to
blend ethanol to the required volume, then she shortfall in obligations must be met
by purchasing RINs in the open market. If more gasoline is sold, more RINs have to
be generated or purchased because the RFS mandate is proportionate to the gasoline
consumption.
Importantly, the effect of transportation costs also depends on the relative prices
of corn ethanol and petroleum blendstock used in the blending process. Note that
Po is per gallon oil price used to proxy for petroleum blendstock.34 Cost of oil makes
up about 2/3 of the cost of petroleum blendstock and the rest of the cost is made
up of refining and distribution costs. The availability of relatively cheaper ethanol is
expected to lessen the distance effect on gasoline price.35 We plot the weekly variation
34
Ethanol is blended with petroleum blendstock that is either conventional blendstock for oxygenate
blending (CBOB) or reformulated blendstock for oxygenate blending (RBOB), with latter being more
expensive to refine. See http://wearethepractitioners.com/library/the-practitioner/2012/
03/15/the-gasoline-bobs-cbob-and-rbob-%28and-carbob%29. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
35
A gallon of ethanol contains 2/3 the energy of a gallon of petroleum blendstock. While relevant,
in this paper we are not concerned with the retail price differentials between E10 (gasoline with up
to 10% ethanol blend) and E0 (100% pure gasoline) sold in certain markets.
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Figure 1.7: The Cost of Ethanol and Crude Oil
Notes: Ethanol price is the spot price at Iowa ethanol plants and oil price is the WTI spot crude oil
price with delivery point in Cushing, Oklahoma.

of ethanol and crude oil spot prices in Figure 1.7. Ethanol price is the spot price of
ethanol at Iowa ethanol plants. While petroleum products are mainly transported by
cost-effective pipelines, ethanol delivery costs vary depending on shipping distances. In
the past cold weather and increased crude oil shipments by rail was blamed for delays in
ethanol shipments from the Midwest, leading to an increase in ethanol delivery prices.
In New York Harbor, this has led to an increase in per gallon shipping costs of ethanol
from usual 10 cents to about $1 in early 2014.36 As Table 1.3 shows the coefficient
estimate for (Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×Dist is negative and statistically significant for
all quantiles. We evaluate the post-2012 effect of distance on retail gasoline prices by
36

See http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579439740561525518. Last
accessed: May 10, 2015.
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Figure 1.8: Changes in Retail Gasoline Price per 1,000 miles (cents/gal.)
Notes: This Figure shows the effect of distance from a city to an ethanol refinery on retail gasoline
prices, as defined in equation 1.5. The overall distance impact depends on the relative costs of ethanol
and petroleum blendstock as well, which is given on the horizontal axis.

controlling for the variation in relative prices of ethanol and petroleum blendstock
below.
The overall impact of distance on retail gasoline prices, after the mandate became
binding, is given by the equation 1.5 and presented graphically in Figure 1.8. The figure
shows changes in gasoline prices per 1,000 miles against the various values of (Pe −Po ).
Note that the value on the horizontal axis for (Pe −Po ) are demeaned by subtracting
from it its post-2012 mean value, which is equal to (Pe − Po )

Y r>2012

= −$0.15 for our

dataset. A movement to the left along the horizontal axis means relative ethanol to
blendstock prices got lower than their post-2012 mean value. For instance, a value
of -$0.50 on the horizontal axis means relative price of ethanol to oil decreased by
about $0.65 from its mean value (e.g. −0.65 − (−0.15) = −0.50). This may occur, for
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example, when ethanol becomes cheaper than oil by $0.65, or when oil price increases
relative to ethanol by $0.65, and/or combination of both. As Figure 1.8 shows, when
the relative ethanol to oil prices move lower, the overall impact of distance on retail
gasoline prices is positive. This result is intuitively sensible: ethanol is more appealing
to blenders when the relative price of petroleum blendstock is high. If ethanol is
costly to ship far away from the Midwest, then theory would predict that only when
ethanol is very appealing to blend (e.g. the relative price of petroleum blendstock
is high) would far away places fully blend. Since ethanol transport costs increase
with distance, this means cities farther away from ethanol production centers face
higher retail gasoline prices than cities closer to ethanol sources. For example, when
(Pe −Po ) = −$0.50, this translates into an additional cost of 4 to 9 cents per gallon
of gasoline for every 1,000 miles depending on the distribution of gasoline prices.
Similarly, back of the envelope calculations show that for a consumer living in Miami,
Florida, which is about 1,450 miles away from the centroid of ethanol production
center in the Midwest (i.e. Iowa), this translates into 5 to 13 cents more per gallon of
gasoline when (Pe −Po ) = −$0.50. We note that an increase in gasoline prices has a
direct effect on transportation costs themselves as diesel fuel used for trains becomes
more expensive.37 Nonetheless, these point estimates seem high, therefore we focus on
the significance of the result.
We observe differential impact as we move to the right along the horizontal axis.
Positive values for (Pe − Po ) imply ethanol becoming less competitive relative to
petroleum blendstock. Surprisingly, when ethanol becomes more expensive than oil,
distance effect on retail gasoline prices is negative. Though unexpected, this result is
less likely to occur because gasoline prices tend to be high (as represented by higher
quantiles in the graph), when oil prices are high. If ethanol is not competitively priced,
then blending ethanol will not be profitable to blenders. Therefore, negative distance
effect observed in the graph is unexpected and unlikely to happen.
37

This is one manifestation of the market friction our paper is concerned with. The coefficient on
(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×Dist will not be subject to that form of market friction, though, since it is
differenced out by (Y r > 2012)×Dist for a given level of retail gasoline prices.
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Table 1.4: Overall Distance Effect on Retail Gasoline Prices

τ ≤ 0.25

τ ≥ 0.75

Pe < Po

+

+

Pe > Po

±

−

Notes: We define τ ≤ 0.25 and τ ≥ 0.75 as corresponding to
lower and upper tails of retail gasoline prices, respectively. When
Pe < Po (top two boxes), blending ethanol becomes attractive
and distance effect is positive. In contrast, when Pe > Po and
τ ≥ 0.75 (i.e. when ethanol becomes more expensive than oil
and retail gasoline prices are already high), the distance has
a negative effect on retail gasoline prices (bottom right box).
We argue that this result is unlikely to occur because when oil
prices are high, gasoline prices tend to be high as well.

To summarize the results, we present the effects of distance on retail gasoline
prices using 2 by 2 table (see Table 1.4). We focus on the tails of retail gasoline price
distribution. We define low retail gasoline prices as corresponding to the distribution
of retail gasoline prices at and below the 25th quantile (i.e. 0 < τ ≤ 0.25) and high
retail gasoline prices − at and above the 75th quantile (i.e. τ ≥ 0.75). When Pe < Po
(top two boxes), the distance effect is positive and cities far from ethanol sources
pay higher retail gasoline prices than cities closer to ethanol sources. This effect is
more pronounced if the retail gasoline prices are already high. In contrast, when
Pe > Po , distance effect on retail gasoline price is generally negative. As explained
above, we believe this negative distance effect is unlikely to happen. For τ ≥ 0.75,
which corresponds to upper tail of gasoline prices, oil prices also tend to be higher
and, therefore, negative distance effect seems counterintuitive.
A related question is could these results be driven by the existence of market
power in the ethanol market? According to the latest analysis conducted by Federal

31

Trade Commission, the U.S. ethanol production industry seems unconcentrated.38
We are not aware if there exists similar analysis about the RIN market. The sharp
increase in RIN prices in 2013 fueled discussions about speculative activity in the
RIN market. High RIN prices post-2012 could be the result of transaction costs or
speculative activity by market participants. Because of lack of information about the
RIN market, we are unable to study the factors behind a sharp spike in RIN prices
in 2013. Therefore, although our results are consistent with the existence of market
power in the ethanol market, we are unable to separate the effects of market power
from the distance effects. What is certain is the existence of market frictions in the
ethanol market due to distance between ethanol plants and blenders. Because of our
difference-in-differences design, we take our results as causal evidence that the binding
ethanol regulation exacerbated market friction that asymmetrically affected retail
gasoline prices in the U.S.

1.6

Robustness Checks

The main regression results presented in Table 1.3 and discussed in the previous
section, use distance from cities to the ethanol production center in the Midwest.
Since distance is used to proxy for transportation costs of ethanol, we consider how
robust our results are to different measures of distance.
Most ethanol plants are small-scale producers that are much smaller than oil
refineries. Typically, demand for ethanol at the city level exceeds the supply by
an individual ethanol producer. Hence, distance from a city to the single nearest
ethanol refinery does not factor the need for additional ethanol from other nearby
ethanol plants. Further, ethanol industry witnessed a number of its facilities having
ceased production either temporarily or permanently due to various factors, including
38

Federal Trade Commission: “2013 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration.”
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Table 1.5: Results Using Weighted Average Distance to the Closest Four Biorefineries

(Y r > 2012)

(0.10)
1.077∗∗∗
(87.86)

(0.25)
1.032∗∗∗
(90.87)

(0.50)
0.995∗∗∗
(86.43)

(0.75)
0.955∗∗∗
(75.10)

(0.90)
0.990∗∗∗
(59.45)

(Pe −Po )

0.197∗∗∗
(29.49)

0.160∗∗∗
(28.55)

0.130∗∗∗
(23.84)

0.0514∗∗∗
(8.51)

0.0502∗∗∗
(6.42)

Po

0.408∗∗∗
(63.12)

0.393∗∗∗
(70.14)

0.380∗∗∗
(70.73)

0.321∗∗∗
(53.23)

0.294∗∗∗
(36.98)

-0.0381∗∗∗
(-3.93)

-0.0101
(-1.09)

-0.0166
(-1.76)

-0.0449∗∗∗
(-4.23)

-0.104∗∗∗
(-7.15)

0.00928
(0.70)

-0.0634∗∗∗
(-5.06)

-0.117∗∗∗
(-9.15)

-0.149∗∗∗
(-10.43)

-0.122∗∗∗
(-6.44)

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )

-0.0740∗∗∗
(-8.87)

-0.0442∗∗∗
(-5.95)

-0.0226∗∗
(-3.09)

0.106∗∗∗
(13.29)

0.154∗∗∗
(14.13)

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×Dist

-0.242∗∗∗
(-8.13)

-0.207∗∗∗
(-7.71)

-0.151∗∗∗
(-5.60)

-0.266∗∗∗
(-8.57)

-0.482∗∗∗
(-10.23)

Constant

0.766∗∗∗
(29.91)

0.856∗∗∗
(37.68)

1.028∗∗∗
(45.45)

1.280∗∗∗
(51.78)

1.386∗∗∗
(42.74)

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

Yes
Yes
58,852

(Y r > 2012)×Dist

(Pe −Po )×Dist

City fixed effects
Month-by-year effects
N

t statistics in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

drought.39 Thus, using distance to a single closest refinery will underestimate the
distance effect on gasoline prices. Instead, we opt to use a weighted average distance
to the nearest ethanol refineries. We experimented with weighted average distances
to the closest four to eight ethanol refineries. Table 1.5 presents the results from the
regression using a weighted average distance to the closest four ethanol plants.
39
For example, shortage of corn idled about 20 ethanol refineries in 2012-2013. See http://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/10/corn-shortage-idles-plants-nationwide/
1906831/. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
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The coefficients on one of the variables of interest, (Y ear > 2012)×Dist, is negative
for all quantiles, but statistically not significant at 25th and 50th quantiles. Regression
estimates using a weighted average distance to closest five to eight ethanol plants
yielded similar results. A closer inspection of the data shows that using a weighted
average distance to closest four to eight ethanol plants underestimates the distance
effect. If in the main regression specification the average distance from a city to the
ethanol production center in the Midwest is 680 miles, it is only 160 miles when we use
a weighted average distance to the nearest four ethanol refineries. Also, the weighted
average distance estimates are significantly lower than the actual national average
ethanol transport distance of approximately 680 miles as found in Strogen et al. (2012).
However, if we evaluate the overall impact of distance, which also depends on the
relative prices of ethanol and petroleum, distance has a positive impact on retail
gasoline prices when (Pe − Po ) falls.40
We also estimated an alternative specification where we define a dummy variable
F ar and set it equal to one for all the cities that are not in PADD 2 region (i.e.
Midwest). This accounts for greater ethanol transport costs when ethanol is shipped
to major demand centers outside the Midwest. The results are presented in Table 1.6.
The coefficient estimate for post-2012 F ar dummy variable, (Y ear > 2012)×F ar, is
positive only at 25th and 50th quantiles, though, they are not statistically significant.
On the other hand, the coefficients on (Y r>2012)×(Pe−Po )×F ar, are negative and
statistically significant.
As further tests, we dropped PADD 1 and PADD 5 regions and compared the
retail gasoline prices between PADD 2 and PADD 3 regions. The results are presented
in Table 1.7. The coefficient on (Y ear > 2012) × F ar is positive and statistically
significant for all quantiles, except for τ = 0.90. The other coefficient of interest,
(Y r > 2012)×(Pe−Po )×F ar, is negative and statistically significant, except for τ = 0.50.
These estimates are consistent with the main results of the paper.
40

When we use WTI crude oil prices instead of PADD-level oil prices, the results are qualitatively
similar.
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Table 1.6: Models of Gasoline Price with Cities Near vs. Far from Biorefineries
(0.10)

(0.25)

(0.50)

(0.75)

(0.90)

1.067∗∗∗

1.010∗∗∗

0.992∗∗∗

0.956∗∗∗

1.022∗∗∗

(96.43)

(85.07)

(82.19)

(62.54)

(57.68)

0.193∗∗∗

0.152∗∗∗

0.118∗∗∗

0.0555∗∗∗

0.0645∗∗∗

(31.93)

(26.01)

(20.70)

(7.64)

(7.76)

0.400∗∗∗

0.388∗∗∗

0.373∗∗∗

0.331∗∗∗

0.315∗∗∗

(68.04)

(65.50)

(65.54)

(45.20)

(36.87)

-0.000386

0.00275

0.00282

-0.0113∗∗∗

-0.0359∗∗∗

(-0.17)

(1.13)

(1.12)

(-3.50)

(-9.47)

-0.00652∗

-0.0224∗∗∗

-0.0320∗∗∗

-0.0444∗∗∗

-0.0354∗∗∗

(-2.26)

(-7.52)

(-10.78)

(-11.61)

(-7.84)

-0.0649∗∗∗

-0.0386∗∗∗

0.00234

0.137∗∗∗

0.205∗∗∗

(-8.45)

(-4.90)

(0.30)

(14.23)

(18.09)

-0.0725∗∗∗

-0.0620∗∗∗

-0.0701∗∗∗

-0.126∗∗∗

-0.245∗∗∗

(-11.01)

(-9.04)

(-10.32)

(-14.66)

(-24.15)

0.885∗∗∗

1.329∗∗∗

1.521∗∗∗

1.764∗∗∗

1.835∗∗∗

(36.46)

(52.75)

(60.51)

(55.69)

(50.49)

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-by-year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

58,852

58,852

58,852

58,852

58,852

(Y r > 2012)

(Pe −Po )

Po

(Y r > 2012)×F ar

(Pe −Po )×F ar

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )

(Y r>2012)×(Pe−Po )×F ar

Constant

N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Notes: We define F ar dummy variable and set it equal to zero if a particular city is in PADD 2
region (Midwest). For all other cities in other PADD regions, it is set equal to one.
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Table 1.7: Models of Gasoline Price with Cities in PADD 2 vs. PADD 3 Regions
(0.10)

(0.25)

(0.50)

(0.75)

(0.90)

0.531∗∗∗

0.508∗∗∗

0.472∗∗∗

0.467∗∗∗

0.439∗∗∗

(41.13)

(31.87)

(29.39)

(32.10)

(26.46)

0.140∗∗∗

0.0998∗∗∗

0.0602∗∗∗

-0.00529

-0.0109

(20.38)

(13.08)

(7.83)

(-0.74)

(-1.27)

0.404∗∗∗

0.400∗∗∗

0.402∗∗∗

0.384∗∗∗

0.351∗∗∗

(55.42)

(48.85)

(50.73)

(52.46)

(39.56)

0.0259∗∗∗

0.0379∗∗∗

0.0398∗∗∗

0.0176∗∗∗

0.00644

(10.39)

(11.45)

(10.82)

(5.07)

(1.54)

-0.00597

0.00172

-0.00816

-0.00526

-0.00288

(-1.58)

(0.36)

(-1.65)

(-1.13)

(-0.52)

-0.00279

0.0240∗

0.0674∗∗∗

0.204∗∗∗

0.256∗∗∗

(-0.32)

(2.35)

(6.71)

(22.82)

(24.42)

-0.0342∗∗∗

-0.0481∗∗∗

-0.0181

-0.0884∗∗∗

-0.188∗∗∗

(-4.05)

(-4.81)

(-1.74)

(-9.28)

(-16.57)

1.260∗∗∗

1.654∗∗∗

1.801∗∗∗

1.962∗∗∗

2.117∗∗∗

(49.07)

(54.58)

(59.32)

(71.91)

(66.53)

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-by-year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

40,886

40,886

40,886

40,886

40,886

(Y r > 2012)

(Pe −Po )

Po

(Y r > 2012)×F ar

(Pe −Po )×F ar

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×F ar

Constant

N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Notes: PADD 2 region is assumed to be closer to the ethanol sources, while PADD 3 region is
assumed to be F ar from ethanol sources in the Midwest.
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Table 1.8: Results for Cities without 10% State Ethanol Mandates

(Y r > 2012)

(0.10)
0.740∗∗∗
(58.07)

(0.25)
0.694∗∗∗
(42.23)

(0.50)
0.714∗∗∗
(49.66)

(0.75)
0.752∗∗∗
(50.02)

(0.90)
0.731∗∗∗
(40.90)

(Pe −Po )

0.195∗∗∗
(27.76)

0.167∗∗∗
(20.09)

0.144∗∗∗
(20.16)

0.0838∗∗∗
(11.18)

0.0916∗∗∗
(9.96)

Po

0.400∗∗∗
(63.14)

0.387∗∗∗
(50.24)

0.374∗∗∗
(57.67)

0.318∗∗∗
(46.07)

0.297∗∗∗
(34.86)

(Y r > 2012)×Dist

0.0172∗∗∗
(4.66)

0.0170∗∗∗
(3.62)

0.00579
(1.43)

-0.0130∗∗
(-3.16)

-0.0364∗∗∗
(-7.25)

(Pe −Po )×Dist

-0.0165∗∗∗
(-3.59)

-0.0436∗∗∗
(-7.44)

-0.0584∗∗∗
(-11.21)

-0.0821∗∗∗
(-14.60)

-0.0801∗∗∗
(-11.04)

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )

-0.0618∗∗∗
(-5.77)

-0.0255∗
(-1.98)

0.0251∗
(2.35)

0.166∗∗∗
(15.53)

0.247∗∗∗
(18.87)

(Y r > 2012)×(Pe −Po )×Dist

-0.0418∗∗∗
(-3.69)
1.110∗∗∗
(45.50)

-0.0481∗∗∗
(-3.53)
1.204∗∗∗
(40.02)

-0.0881∗∗∗
(-7.78)
1.314∗∗∗
(50.67)

-0.147∗∗∗
(-12.68)
1.497∗∗∗
(55.38)

-0.262∗∗∗
(-17.81)
1.678∗∗∗
(51.51)

Yes
Yes
54,302

Yes
Yes
54,302

Yes
Yes
54,302

Yes
Yes
54,302

Yes
Yes
54,302

Constant

City fixed effects
Month-by-year effects
N

t statistics in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: Regression is run by dropping cities with 10% state ethanol mandates (Minnesota, Missouri,
and Oregon).

A number of states have their own renewable fuel policies. These policies are
generally more stringent than the RFS mandate at the national level. For example,
Hawaii, Missouri, and Oregon require exactly 10% ethanol content for gasoline sold in
those states (see Table 1.2). As a result, blenders in those states might not have much
flexibility when to blend and how much to blend. Therefore, we reestimate our model
by dropping cities in states with exactly 10% ethanol mandates (Missouri, Oregon,
and Minnesota). The results presented in Table 1.8 did not change in a significant
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way and are of similar magnitude as the main results.41 Perhaps, obligated parties
(blenders and refiners) over-complied with the mandate and therefore, dropping states
with more stringent ethanol policies did not alter our results significantly.

1.7

Conclusion

The 2007 renewable fuels standard (RFS) significantly boosted the demand for ethanol.
Wholesale blending terminals, where ethanol is blended into gasoline before it is
delivered to retail gasoline stations, are in the position to choose the amount of
blending. The minimum quantity of ethanol required to be blended is regulated by
RFS and is a yearly volume rather than a percentage of finished gasoline. This is a
unique aspect of the policy for our study: a volumetric mandate permits blenders to
have more flexibility in choosing their blending strategy within a year.
In the early years, the quantity of ethanol blended into fuel exceeded the mandated
quantities each years since the RFS’s inception in 2008. Therefore, mandate was most
likely not binding during this period. Up until 2013 the price of ethanol renewable
identification numbers (RINs), which is a better indicator of a binding mandate, has
been consistently close to zero. Beginning with 2013, the situation was much different.
An anticipation of higher blending mandates in 2013 and beyond, and an impending
10% blend wall meant that meeting the mandate by obligated parties (blenders and
refiners) would be more difficult and expensive. Lack of infrastructure for blending
ethanol and the limited access to the cost effective way of shipping ethanol throughout
the U.S., had differentially affected the incidence of a policy across the country.
In this paper we look at the implication of a binding mandate on retail gasoline
prices through the ethanol transportation cost channel. The existence of bottlenecks
in ethanol infrastructure and access to ethanol blendstock across the regional markets
may lead to unintended consequences. We find evidence that the RFS created a
market friction in the ethanol industry due to transportation costs of moving ethanol
41

Hawaii is not in the contiguous U.S. and, therefore, is not included in our analysis.

38

throughout the U.S. Using weekly retail gasoline price data from over 200 cities in
the U.S. and a quantile difference-in-differences estimator, we find that distance from
cities to ethanol production centers has resulted in differential impacts on gasoline
prices over space. Cities farther from the ethanol sources paid higher gasoline prices
relative to the cities in upper Midwest. As the mandate became binding starting
in 2013, more ethanol has to be shipped to far away places. With yearly increases
in the amount of ethanol consumption due to the mandate, more ethanol must be
shipped and that additional blending must have come from places outside the Midwest
at greater costs. Importantly, retail gasoline price impact of transportation cost of
moving ethanol from the Corn Belt across to other states depends on the relative
prices of corn ethanol and petroleum blendstock.
Our results highlight the spatial incidence associated with the mandated ethanol
market. Ordinary least squares regression estimates the conditional mean and,
therefore, is not adequate to capture distributional impact arising from dynamic
market incentives. Because of our quantile difference-in-differences design, we take
our results as causal evidence that the ethanol regulation led to market frictions
that asymmetrically affected retail gasoline prices in the U.S. We do not attempt to
find the total effects of a mandate on average gasoline prices. Rather, our results
shed light on the incidence of the policy due to market frictions created by the
lack of infrastructure in the ethanol industry. This may be of particular interest to
policymakers in alleviating these market frictions from their market designs.
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Chapter 2
Point Forecast Accuracy of Model
Averaging in Carbon Dioxide
Emissions Using U.S. State-Level
Data
2.1

Introduction

Carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emitted from fossil fuel (oil, gas, and coal) combustion is
the largest contributor to global CO2 emissions. Projections of CO2 is of particular
importance in evaluating policies to address CO2 due to human activity. While
literature on forecasting emissions is copious, reported forecasts may differ significantly
due to differences in their model specifications and the estimation techniques.
Among the class of emissions forecasts, early works focused on modeling emissions
based on Environmental Kuznetz Curve (EKC) hypothesis, where emissions first
rise with income and then fall after a certain income level is reached (Holtz-Eakin
and Selden (1995), Selden and Song (1994), Grossman and Krueger (1995)). Later
work examined the EKC hypothesis using more flexible approaches (Schmalensee
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et al. (1998)). However, not all studies agree with the conclusions of the EKC
hypothesis (Perman and Stern (2003), Stern (2004), Cole (2005)). More recent studies
experimented with dynamic modeling approaches to emission projections with some
success (Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012)). While models and methods used to
forecast CO2 emissions are continually being perfected, there may be benefits from
combining existing models.
Studies on forecast combination go back to at least Bates and Granger (1969)
and Sanders (1963). In forecasting meteorological events, Sanders (1963) noted
that averaging subjective individual forecasts did significantly better than the best
individual forecast. The results from recent empirical and theoretical literature indicate
that forecast combination typically leads to increased forecast accuracy, sometimes
dramatically (Clemen (1989), Stock and Watson (2004), Timmermann (2006), Issler
and Lima (2009)). Even simple averaging of forecasts are found to produce better
forecasts on average than the forecasts generated from the best individual models
(Timmermann, 2006). If the true data generating process is unknown, which is true in
many situations, then pooling forecasts has the advantage of making use of a wider
information set than is available to each individual model. This may lead to better
forecast performance relative to that of individual model. Not surprisingly, forecast
combinations have increasingly been used in forecasting financial and economic data.
However, despite the abundance of models and estimation methods used in
forecasting emissions, application of forecast combination to CO2 emissions is lacking.
Indeed, one of the key recommendations of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Expert Meeting in Boulder, Colorado, was to generate ideas for the
evaluation and combination of projections from various modeling techniques.1
In this paper we evaluate the predictive accuracy of various individual models
found in CO2 emissions literature and their linear combinations. Using state-level
data for the U.S., we show that combining multiple forecasts of CO2 emissions can be
1

IPCC, 2010: Meeting Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Expert Meeting
on Assessing and Combining Multi Model Climate Projections. IPCC Working Group I Technical
Support Unit, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland.
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useful alternative to individual model forecasts. We test the forecast accuracy and
present evidence that the best forecast combination may outperform the forecasts
from individual model specifications. Importantly, we find that the performance of
the best individual forecast is not significantly better than that of the best performing
forecast combination.
The individuals models used in this study have been chosen to represent differences
in modeling approaches used as well as their significance in the studies on CO2
emissions forecasts. While there are many other potential models to consider, we are
constrained by their data requirements and the need to forecast their regressors. As
for forecast combination, there are many candidate combination techniques to consider.
We consider forecast combinations that have been applied in many empirical studies
as well as recent advances in this area. Although alternative combinations may lead to
better forecasting performance, our goal is to assess whether pooling multiple forecasts
will improve forecasting CO2 emissions relative to individual models. We consider
combination techniques due to Bates and Granger (1969), Granger and Ramanathan
(1984), simple equal-weights forecast averaging, and bias-corrected forecast averaging
due to Issler and Lima (2009). Briefly, Bates and Granger (1969) suggested to combine
multiple forecasts by weighting them inversely to their mean squared error (MSE),
while in Granger and Ramanathan (1984) approach combination weights are obtained
by regressing individual forecasts on their actual values. In equal-weights forecast
averaging no combination weights are estimated. It is the simple average of individual
forecasts. Bias-corrected average forecast is an extension of equal-weights forecast
that seeks to remove time-invariant bias present in individual models. Estimation of
these methods as well as individual models are discussed in more detail below.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
discussion of forecast combination problems and approaches to forecast combination.
It also introduces individual model specifications considered in this paper. In section
2.3 we explain our empirical exercise and methodology. It also presents the dataset
that is the basis of our study and discusses the reported results. Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2

Forecast Combination

In a recent survey, Timmermann (2006) discusses a number of potential reasons for
forecast combination. First, mean squared forecast error (MSFE) can be minimized
by combining individual forecasts due to gains from diversification. Second, individual
forecasts may differ in how quickly they adapt to the new data if they are subjected
to structural breaks. In this case, combining of individual forecasts may result, on
average, in better forecast than forecasts obtained from individual models themselves.
Third, because the true data generating process is usually unknown, individual
model specifications are often misspecified. The diversification argument imply that
combining forecasts helps reduce the misspecification biases that may be present in
individual models.
For non-nested models, the plausibility of pooled forecasts is intuitively easy to
understand. If two forecasts derive their properties from different information sets, the
pooling forecasts allows one to use a wider information set. This, in turn, minimizes
the quadratic loss function, such as mean squared error (MSE), leading to a better
forecast performance. Surveys of empirical literature on forecast combinations agree
that forecast combinations leads to increased forecast accuracy (Clemen (1989), Stock
and Watson (2004)). As these studies show, even the simple averaging of predictors
often dominates individual predictors.
For nested models, the benefits from model forecast combination are not clear-cut.
Clark and McCracken (2009) found that forecast combination can be effective even for
the nested models, but their effectiveness hinges on the assumption that population
parameters are unknown and sample size is finite. If the decision maker knows the
true population parameters, then one of the nested models encompasses the other
model. Then, optimal forecast combination of these two models will assign either zero
or unitary weight. In practical terms, population parameters are usually not known
to the econometrician in advance.
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2.2.1

The forecast combination problem

Here we follow Timmermann (2006) and briefly describe the forecast combination
problem faced by a decision-maker. Given the set of N point forecasts, a decisionmaker would like to combine those forecasts by minimizing some loss function, such
as mean squared error (MSE) or mean absolute error (MAE):

ω ∗t+h,t = argωt+h,t ∈Ωt min E[L(ect+h,t (ω t+h,t ))|ŷ t+h,t ]

(2.1)

where ω t+h,t are the estimated optimal weights for h-step ahead forecasts at time t,
L = L(ect+h ) denotes some loss function as a function of forecast error from combination,
and ŷ t+h,t is a vector of forecasts. Assuming quadratic loss function, optimal weights
for forecast combination are found by minimizing the MSE:

L(y t+h, , ŷt+h,t ) = θ(yt+h − ŷt+h,t )2 ,

θ>0

(2.2)

where ŷt+h denotes h-step ahead forecast of a variable of interest. Since individual
model forecasts are likely biased themselves, estimated weights can be biased as well.
However, as noted in Timmermann (2006) information aggregation tends to reduce
the forecast variance. Under MSE loss function, these two effects are easy to see:

L(·) = E[e2t+h,t ] = E[et+h,t ]2 + V ar(et+h,t )
In other words, while the estimated weights increase the forecast bias, combining
multiple models may reduce the variance of the forecasts. In order to minimize the
squared loss function, the decision-maker should consider trading off these two effects.

2.2.2

Diversification gain from forecast combination

The gains from forecast combinations can be explained similar to diversification gains
in portfolio choice in the finance literature. Here we borrow from Timmermann (2006)
to show the value of forecast combinations. Consider a decision maker with quadratic
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loss function who has access to two forecasts, ŷ1 and ŷ2 . We assume forecasts errors
are unbiased with e1 = y − ŷ1 ∼ (0, σ12 ) and e2 = y − ŷ2 ∼ (0, σ22 ), and their associated
covariance is given by σ12 = ρ12 σ1 σ2 . ρ12 denotes the correlation between the two
forecasts errors. If we assume combination weights are constrained to equal one,
(ω, 1 − ω), the forecast error from the forecast combination is equal to the weighted
average of the two individual forecasts:

ec = ωe1 + (1 − ω)e2

(2.3)

The forecast error has an expected value of zero. The variance under forecast
combination takes the form

V ar(ec ) = σc2 (ω) = ω 2 σ12 + (1 − ω)2 σ22 + 2ω(1 − ω)σ12

(2.4)

The decision-maker’s objective is to minimize the forecast error variance in equation
2.4 which is easily solved through differentiation. The solution to the first order
conditions yields the following weights

ω∗ =

σ22 − σ12
,
σ12 + σ22 − 2σ12

1 − ω∗ =

σ12 − σ12
σ12 + σ22 − 2σ12

(2.5)

We note that the weights have the same denominator, but the forecast error
variance from the competing forecast enters their numerators. Thus, a more accurate
forecast receives a larger weight and poor performing forecast receives a smaller weight.
By substituting ω ∗ into the objective function, we get the expected value of MSE from
the combination scheme:

σc2 =

σ12 σ22 (1 − ρ212 )
σ12 + σ22 − 2ρ12 σ1 σ2

(2.6)

We now can compare the forecast accuracy from combination of individual forecasts
using their MSE. After some algebra, we see that σc2 ≤ min(σ12 , σ22 ), which means
combining two forecasts generally results in smaller MSE than that of individual
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model forecasts. Only under special cases, does the diversification gain disappear.
Specifically, when (i) σ1 = 0 or σ2 = 0, or (ii) σ1 = σ2 and ρ12 = 1, or (iii) ρ12 =

σ1
,
σ2

there is no diversification gain from combination of two forecasts.
Timmermann (2006) also compares the variances of forecast error from the
optimal combination (equation 2.6) to forecast error variances from other common
combination approaches. In combination scheme proposed by Bates and Granger
(1969), combination weights are estimated inversely to their relative MSE as follows:
σ22
,
σ12 + σ22

ωinv =

1 − ωinv =

σ12
σ12 + σ22

(2.7)

This produces the following forecast error variance:

2
σinv

σ12 σ22 (σ12 + σ22 + 2ρ12 σ1 σ2 )
=
(σ12 + σ22 )2

(2.8)

The ratio of this forecast error variance to the value obtained using optimal weights
above is equal to
2
σinv
σc2

=

1
1 − ρ212


1−

2σ12
+ σ22

2 !

σ12

(2.9)

Two conditions are possible depending on the values of forecast error variance from
2
individual forecasts. For instance, if σ1 6= σ2 , Timmermann (2006) show that σinv
> σc2

unless ρ12 = 0. In other words, when both models add additional information, optimal
weights forecast combination will have smaller MSE than that of combination schemes
developed by Bates and Granger (1969). If, however, σ1 = σ2 , then MSE from both
combination schemes are equal, which implies ωinv = ω ∗ = 1/2.
Finally, the performance of optimal weights forecast combination is compared to
that of simple average forecast combination. Simple average forecast combination
assigns equal weights to each individual model forecasts. This produces the following
MSE:
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1
1
1
2
= σ12 + σ22 + σ1 σ2 ρ12
σEW
4
4
2

(2.10)

By comparing their respective MSE, we find that their ratio is equal to:
2
σEW
=
σc2



2
(σ12 + σ22 − 4σ12
4σ12 σ22 (1 − ρ212 )

2
(2.11)

2
After some algebra, we can see that σEW
> σc2 unless σ1 = σ2 , in which case
2
σEW
= σc2 . Hence, theoretically simple equal-weighted average forecast approximates

the optimal forecast in MSE sense only when the forecast error variances from the
two models are the same. Nevertheless, as discussed above, equal-weights forecast
combinations performed well in many applications and because of its simplicity it
remains as an attractive approach to forecast combination.

2.2.3

Forecast combination approaches

In this subsection we describe forecast combination approaches used in this paper.
Specifically, we consider (1) equal weights forecast averaging, (2) bias-corrected forecast
averaging suggested by Issler and Lima (2009), (3) forecast combination proposed
by Bates and Granger (1969), and (4) Granger and Ramanathan (1984) forecast
combination. As noted above, we focus on combination schemes that combines
individual predictions linearly. While there many combination approaches to consider,
even the small number of combinations considered here are sufficient to show the gains
from combination to forecasting CO2 emissions.
Equal weights forecast combination
Simple averaging of forecasts,

1
N

PN

i=1

i
yt+h,t
is empirically shown to work well in a

variety of applications. Results from empirical works show that simple average of
forecasts works surprisingly well in many settings, often outperforming individual
predictions and some other combination schemes that try to estimate “optimal weights”
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(Stock and Watson (2004), Aiolfi et al. (2010)). One simple explanation for this equalweighted “forecast combination puzzle” is that it does not require estimation of weights,
while optimal weights require estimation of N weights that grow asymptotically with
the number of forecasts (Issler and Lima (2009), Smith and Wallis (2009)).2
In addition, model instability arising from structural breaks may explain why
simple pooling of forecasts may be successful than some other forms of combination
schemes. As Hendry and Clements (2004) illustrated, when unanticipated structural
breaks can occur later in period equal weights combination may fair better than both
the individual projections and other forecast combination approaches. This is because
weights based on prior performance are not affected by later breaks in the data. This
may result in poorer outcomes for forecast combinations with estimated weights.
Even when the individual models are misspecified average forecasts dominated other
approaches (Hendry and Clements (2004)).
Bias-corrected average forecast
The techniques suggested by Issler and Lima (2009) is an extension of equal weights
model averaging. They note that if forecasts from individual models are biased, then
their simple average may be biased as well. Their approach corrects for time-invariant
bias present in individual model forecasts. By construction this should result in
improved forecast performance relative to equal weights forecast averaging. First, we
need to estimate equal weights model averaging, which is then corrected by subtracting
the bias-correction term as the following equation shows:
N
1 X i
ŷ
− B̂
N i=1 t+h,t

where B̂ represents a market bias.
2
So called “curse of dimensionality,” where more weights need to be estimated as N increases,
diminishes the consistency of the estimated weights themselves. See Issler and Lima (2009) for
details.
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Before bias-correction term is estimated, we express the forecast of a target variable,
i
ŷt+h,t
, as two-way decomposition of the forecast error as follows:

i
ŷt+h,t
− yt = ki + ηt + εi,t

where k i is individual model time-invariant bias, η t − unforecastable component,
and εi,t is model-specific or idiosyncratic error term. Forecast combination diversifies
the risk associated with εi,t , but cannot do the same for η t . On the other hand, k i
can be eliminated by specifically introducing a bias-correction term into the forecast
combination. In order to compute the bias correction term B̂, the data is divided
into three sub-periods: t = 1, 2, ..., T1 , ..., T2 , ..., T . The first sub-period covering,
t = 1, 2, ..., T1 , is called “estimation” sample and is used to fit the individual models.
The second sub-period, t = T1 + 1, ...T2 , is called the “training” sample, where the
forecast combination weights and bias-correction terms are estimated. As in Issler
and Lima (2009), we first compute each model’s time-invariant bias as
T2
X
1
k̂i =
(ŷ i
− yt )
T2 − T1 t=T +1 t+h,t
1

Once the individual model biases are estimated, the average bias for N models is
obtained by a simple average as

B̂ =

N
1 X
k̂i
N i=1

Finally, in the last sub-period or “evaluation” sample, t = T2 + 1, ..., T , the
equal weights forecast is corrected for a possible bias by subtracting the average
P
i
bias: N1 N
i=1 yt+h,t − B̂. Authors note that in large samples, as both N and T → ∞,
bias-corrected average forecast becomes an optimal forecasting instrument.
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Bates and Granger forecast combination
In a seminal paper, Bates and Granger (1969) suggested using empirical weights based
on each model’s out of sample forecast variance. If the forecasts are unbiased and
their errors uncorrelated, the estimated weights approach optimal weights. Following
their methodology, in the first step we obtain out-of-sample forecasts and forecast
errors to compute the mean squared forecast error (MSFE). Then, the weight for each
model is inverted, 1/σi2 , and normalized by the sum of the forecast variances across
all N models,
1/σ 2
ω i = PN i 2
j=1 1/σj
where σi2 is the MSFE from model i0 s individual forecast. By construction,
forecasts that performed well in the estimation sample are given greater weight in the
combination exercise.
Granger and Ramanathan forecast combination
Unlike the other combinations schemes, this method uses an econometric approach to
estimate forecast weights. Granger and Ramanathan (1984) considered three different
regression methods to forecast combinations. In the first regression method, they
regress the forecasts on actual values with no constant term. In the second case,
weights are constrained to sum to one and forecasts are regressed on actual values
with no constant term. Their third approach, which they call it their best method,
the regression is estimated with constant and no restrictions on the weights. Here we
consider only their best method that gives the smallest MSFE. Given N forecasts, the
combination weights are obtained by the usual least squares estimator by regressing
the target variable y t on the N candidate forecasts:
yt = α + β1 ŷt1 + ... + βN ŷtN + ut
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The constant term adjusts for the bias present in individual forecasts. As with
other combination schemes, the weights are obtained in the estimation sample and
used in the evaluation period to compare the out-of-sample forecasting performances.

2.2.4

Individual models

In this subsection, we describe each individual model that enters the forecast
combinations considered above as ‘inputs.’ The individual models used in this study
have been chosen to represent differences in modeling approaches and econometric
techniques present in empirical works on CO2 emissions as well as tractability of
their data requirements. More importantly, these models have been highly influential
leading to many discussions in the subsequent literature on emissions. The first model
we use is proposed by Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) who employed the following
specification:

ln(cit ) = δi + γt + β1 ln(rgdppcit ) + β2 ln(rgdppct )2 + it
where ln(cit ) are log per capita carbon emissions for country i in year t, δi is
a country fixed effect, γt is a year fixed effect, and ln(rgdppcit ) are log per capita
real GDP for country i in year t. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) test this general
EKC specification using both linear and log-linear specifications and report similar
results. According to the EKC hypothesis, emissions first rise with income and then
decline after a country reaches a certain income level. Selden and Song (1994) and
Grossman and Krueger (1995) both report an inverted U-shaped relationship between
levels of economic development and various air pollutants. The “Kuznets” or inverted
U-shaped relationship between economic development and emissions is by no means
uncontroversial. Perman and Stern (2003), Stern (2004), and Cole (2005) question the
existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and emissions. Cole
(2005) finds an inverted U-shaped relationship for CO2 using the OECD-only sample,
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but when heterogeneity across countries is allowed, the income-emissions relationship
is found to vary widely across countries.
The second model suggested by Schmalensee et al. (1998) also forecasts carbon
emissions using the EKC relationship, but with more flexible income specification:

ln(cit ) = δi + γt + F [ln(rgdppcit )] + it
where F (·) is a spline (piecewise linear) function. Schmalensee et al. (1998) use 8and 10-segment splines with the same number of observations for each spline. We use
10-segment spline model following subsequent studies that try to replicate Schmalensee
et al. (1998) model.3
In a recent study Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) forecast U.S. CO2 emissions
using state level data. They build a model universe using a small subset of variables
found in existing reduced-form models. In addition to variables used in the previous
two models above, they also include lagged emissions, population density, and several
categorical variables in their specifications. Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012)
note that dynamic specifications with lagged emissions are appropriate in emissions
projections because CO2 emissions originate from a durable capital stock. These
sparse set of variables lead to more than 27, 000 unique model specifications. The
search over this model universe yielded the following specification with the lowest
MSFE for aggregate CO2 emissions:

ln(cit ) = α + ρi ln(ci,t−1 ) + β1 ln(pdensit ) + β2 oili + it
where ln(pdensit ) is log population density for state i in year t and oil is a
categorical variable equal one for oil- or gas-producing states. The selection of the best
model based on per capita MSFE resulted in a different functional form specification.
If the goal is to forecast aggregate emissions, then selection based on the aggregate
MSFE, rather than per capita MSFE, is more appropriate. It is likely that a different
3

See Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012), for instance.
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set of best performing models will be chosen, for example as the sample size or forecast
horizon is varied. Since our objective is to evaluate the performance of combining
multiple forecasts in relation to individual models, we are not overly concerned over
potential misspecification issue. In addition, combining multiple forecasts are generally
robust to potential biases of unknown form (Timmermann, 2006).
Our final benchmark model is based on Yang and Schneider (1998) specification:

carbonit = populationit ×

rgdpit
energyit carbonit
×
×
populationit
rgdpit
energyit

where carbonit is the total carbon emitted in country i in year t, populationit is
population in country i in year t, energyit is the total energy consumption in country
i in year t, and rgdpit is real GDP in country i in year t. In turn, their model is based
on IPAT identity by Ehrlich et al. (1971). According to IPAT identity, I = P · A · T ,
I (impact or emissions) is decomposed into P (population), A (affluence, measured
in per capita GDP), and T (technology index). The identity implies that emissions
increase monotonically with P and A, but decrease with the level of T . Yang and
Schneider (1998) use an extension of IPAT identity to decompose the emissions into
four factors: population size, GDP per capita, energy intensity (total energy consumed
per unit of GDP), and carbon intensity (average CO2 emissions per unit of fossil fuel
consumed).

2.3

Empirical Exercise

Our main goal is to evaluate the performance of forecasts from individual model
specifications and their linear combinations. This section discusses the estimation
method used in the empirical exercise. We use state-level data from 1960 to 2012
and conduct out-of-sample forecasts of per capita and total CO2 emissions in the U.S.
We obtain forecasts of state-level emissions first, which is then aggregated to obtain
emission forecasts for the U.S. There are at least two reasons for forecasting using
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disaggregated data instead of directly forecasting the aggregate CO2 emissions for the
U.S. First, Lütkepohl (2011) and Marcellino et al. (2003) note that if the disaggregate
data are heterogeneous and intertemporally related, forecasting components first and
then aggregating the forecasts may lead to better forecasts. The dataset we have
shows variation in per capita emissions and other variables both across states and time.
Second, our objective is to compare the forecasts from reduced form specifications and
their combinations. All the models we consider use disaggregated data. As is common
in empirical literature, the empirical illustration in this paper involves short-term
forecasts. Next, we explain the methodology of our empirical exercise in more detail.

2.3.1

Methodology

First, the data is divided into three sub-periods: 1960-1989, 1990-2004, and 2005-2012.
The first sub-period, called “estimation” sample, is used for estimation of individual
models. Then fitted models are used to obtain forecasts for the second sub-period
which we call “training” sample. We use the forecasts for the period covering 1990-2004
to estimate the combination weights to be used for various combination approaches
considered in this paper. The final sub-period has 8 observations and is referred to
as “evaluation” sample. Out-of-sample forecasts for 2005-2012 are compared for each
individual model and their combinations using the weights obtained in the training
sample. We evaluate one-year ahead (h=1) through five-year ahead forecasts (h=5).
There are different approaches to forecasting depending on how the estimation
window is chosen. We employ recursive expanding window approach where the initial
estimation sample (1960-1989) is used to estimate individual models to produce h-step
ahead forecasts. Then the estimation sample is increased by one more year covering
1960-1990 and individual models are re-estimated to produce h-step ahead forecasts
for the next period. Thus, for 1990-2004 training sample we estimate 15 h-step ahead
forecasts. The training sample forecasts are, in turn, used to estimate combination
weights. The procedure to estimate those weights are discussed above in the subsection

54

on forecast combination approaches. By their construction, equal-weights and its
variation of bias-corrected average forecasts by Issler and Lima (2009) do not require
estimation of forecast combination weights.
Once the weights are computed, we then conduct pseudo-out-of-sample forecasts for
2005-2012 as follows. Each individual specification is re-estimated using an expanding
window to obtain h-step ahead forecasts for 2005-2012 evaluation sub-period.4 We
combine these h-step ahead individual forecasts with the estimated weights obtained
in the training sample. Per capita emissions projections are multiplied by state
population to get state aggregate emission forecasts. Aggregate CO2 emissions for the
U.S. is found by summing the total emissions over 50 states. Then individual forecasts
and their combinations are compared to each other based on their root-mean squared
forecast error (RMSFE) computed as follows:
2012
50
1 X X
bT +h )2
MSFE for Aggregate Emissions =
(CT +h − C
8 T =2005 i=1

√
RM SF E =

M SF E

where CT +h are total emissions for state i in year T + h.
MSFE and RMSFE for U.S. per capita emissions are estimated in a similar fashion.
To do so, we divide the aggregate U.S. emissions by U.S. population to get per capita
emissions for the U.S. Forecasts are then tested for significance of their predictive
accuracy using formal statistical procedures. We tested the accuracy of forecasts using
two loss functions found in the forecast evaluation literature: squared error loss and
absolute value of loss. In the first approach, squared error losses from two competing
forecasts, which correspond to MSFE above, are tested for equal predictive ability. In
the absolute loss case, we test whether mean absolute errors (MAE) from competing
two forecasts are the same. MAE is obtained as follows:
4

Recursive one-step ahead estimation requires estimation of 23 regressions for each individual
model for 1960-1989, 1960-1990, 1960-1991, etc. periods. With four individual models, we have
estimated a total of 92 regressions.
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2012
50
1 X X
bT +h
MAE for Aggregate Emissions =
CT +h − C
8 T =2005 i=1

For models with contemporaneous explanatory variables we need projections of
these variables for out-of-sample forecasts. While population projections can be
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau or other state agencies, projections of state
personal income series are not readily available. In the following subsection, we
describe our methodology used for right-hand-side variable predictions.

2.3.2

Projections of Explanatory Variables

In a series of studies Barro et al. (1991) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) have
examined the convergence across U.S. states and regional convergence within other
countries. They find evidence of convergence across U.S. states where poorer states
tend to grow faster than wealthy ones. We follow their approach and regress state
average growth rates of per capita income over some time interval on the initial level
of per capita income:
1
· ln
T



yit
yi,t−T


= β0 + β1 · ln(y,t−T ) + uit,t−T

where yit is the real per capita personal income in state i at time t, yi,t−T is the
real per capita personal income in state i at the beginning of the interval, and T is the
length of the time interval. The estimated equation for the cross-section of states using
data for 1960-2012 yields the following result with the standard errors in parentheses:

(1/52) × [ln(yi,2012 ) − ln(yi,1960 ] = 0.029 − 0.0001[ln(yi,1960 )]
(0.002)

0.0001

The coefficient on initial per capita personal income is negative and statistically
significant. This means that U.S. states display conditional β-convergence: poorer
states grow faster than rich ones. We estimate series of cross-sectional regressions
for different time intervals to predict the growth rates of per capita personal income.
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Overall, the results are consistent with the results reported in Barro and Sala-i Martin
(1992).
For population projections, we decided to make projections for both state
population and personal income in order to replicate the problem a forecaster
may encounter in making true out-of-sample forecasts. We estimate first order
autoregressive (AR(1)) model for each state separately:

populationit = β0 + β1 · populationi,t−1 + eit
Once we obtain population projections, we make population density predictions for
each state under the assumption that state land areas remain constant over the forecast
horizon. Population density projections are needed for forecasting Auffhammer and
Steinhauser (2012) model specification.
For both Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) and Schmalensee et al. (1998) specifications,
we need predictions for time and state fixed effects in order to conduct out-of-sample
forecasts. For the former, we follow their approach and set the year fixed effects at
last year’s estimated value. However, this assumption rules out the effects of future
technological changes on emissions. For Schmalensee et al. (1998) specification, we
follow their steps and project the time fixed effects by regressing estimated time fixed
effects on the following linear spline model:
βt = β0 + β1 t + β2 (t − 1970) · 1[t ≥ 1970]
This specification for projecting time fixed effects assumes that the trend after
1970 will continue into the future.5
Finally, we need projections of state fixed effects for out-of-sample forecasts.
Alternatively, we could transform the data by demeaning the variables along the
5

Schmalensee et al. (1998) also considered nonlinear trend model with βt = β0 +β1 +β2 ln(t−1940).
This specification forecasts flattening time fixed effects into the future. While the authors report
results from both specifications, they do not offer their preference for either specification. Therefore,
we do not consider the nonlinear trend model here.
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time dimension for each panel. This eliminates the need for projections of state fixed
effects. However, the latter approach makes the computation somewhat difficult as the
forecasting exercise considers various forecast horizons. Since we have large enough
observations per panel, we estimate state fixed effects model, predict those fixed effects
for the estimation sample and extend them into the forecast horizon.
Since it becomes cumbersome to forecast explanatory variables as the number of
individual models to be used in forecast combination exercise is increased, we did not
include other alternative specifications. Nonetheless, as it becomes clear in the next
subsection, even with small number of forecasts used in this study, we are able to
show the benefit of applying forecast combination to CO2 emissions.

2.3.3

Data

Our objective is to evaluate the forecasting performance of combining multiple forecasts
against the performance of individual models. To do so, we use U.S. state-level data
from 1960 to 2012. The dataset is an annual data for 50 U.S. states from 1960 to 2012
and does not include Washington D.C. Thus, there are total of 2,650 observations
for each variable, except for energy and carbon intensity growth rates. The data on
energy and carbon intensity growth rates are given for 1990-2012 period.
We have collected the dataset from a variety of sources. Data for 1960-2010
estimates of annual fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emitted to the atmosphere (in million
metric tons of carbon) for each 50 U.S. states are obtained from Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.6 We then combine
this dataset with 2011 and 2012 U.S. state-level carbon dioxide emissions (in million
metric tons of carbon dioxide) which we obtained from the Environmental Protection
Agency.7
6

See http://cdiac.ornl.gov/CO2_Emission/timeseries/usa. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
See
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/activities/ghg-inventory.html#
four. Last accessed: May 10, 2015.
7
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, 1960-2012
Variable

Unit

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Total CO2 Emissions

mill.metric tons

96.86

101.55

3.61

721.42

Per capita CO2 Emissions

metric tons

23.13

15.66

7.83

132.71

Per capita personal income

thous. US $

30.87

8.96

9.86

61.59

Population

thous. persons

4,875

5,374

229.00

38,000

Land Area

sq.miles

70,637

84,969

1,034

570,641

Population Density

per sq.mile

164.37

233.59

0.40

1,206

Energy Intensity

% change

-1.17

0.46

-1.70

-0.76

Carbon Intensity

% change

-0.47

0.53

-0.94

0.14

2,650

2,650

2,650

2,650

Total Observations

Note: Energy and carbon intensity growth rates are for 1990-2012 period.

We present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical exercise
in Table 2.1. Typically, to examine the EKC hypothesis per capita emissions are
regressed on real per capita GDP. Although GDP by state are preferred series, there is
a discontinuity in the state GDP data at 1997 due to changes in industry specifications.
Therefore, we use state personal income (in thousands of U.S. dollars) series instead.
We note that other researchers have also used state personal income series when
using state level data in forecasting emissions and studying income convergence across
states.8 We convert the state personal income series into 2012 U.S. dollars using
consumer price index for all consumers. Consumer price index comes from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, while personal income and population by states are both taken
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.9 We then divide state carbon emissions by
8

See Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) for emissions, and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) for
income convergence, for instance.
9
Both data series are available at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm. Last
accessed: May 10, 2015.
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state population to generate per capita emissions (in metric tons of carbon) by state
to be used in our empirical exercises.
Population density by state is obtained by dividing state population by their
respective land areas (in sq.miles). Land area is the total area of a state excluding water
areas and is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau.10 We collected information whether
a state is oil producing or not from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
historical crude oil production series.11 In addition, for Yang and Schneider (1998)
model we need energy and carbon intensity factors. In their paper, Yang and Schneider
(1998) provide annual rates of change for each factor. We can use these rates in
projections of CO2 emissions without needing the initial values of each factor. For
example, CO2 emission projections in subsequent years will be calculated as the
product of last period’s CO2 emissions and the sum of the growth rates of each four
factors.
As the Table 2.1 shows there is a sufficiently large variation in both total CO2
emissions and per capita CO2 emission series over the study period. We observe this
large variability both across space and over time. For example, per capita emissions
ranged from 7.83 to 132.71 metric tons of CO2 with a standard deviation of 15.66.
Aggregate state-level emissions ranged from 3.61 to 721.42 million metric tons of CO2
with a standard deviation of 101.55. Similarly, for other variables in the dataset we
observe large variation both across states and years. In terms of total state emission
levels, Vermont has been the state with the lowest total CO2 emissions, while Texas
remains to be the largest CO2 emitter. In terms of per capita emissions, Wyoming
has the highest CO2 emission levels per person for each subsequent decade since
1960. The heterogeneity in per capita CO2 emissions across the U.S. states is one
of the reasons why we prefer to use state-level, rather than aggregated data, in our
10

See https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html. Last accessed: May 10,
2015.
11
See http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm. Last accessed: May 10,
2015.
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Figure 2.1: Per Capita CO2 Emissions for Selected Years (metric tons of CO2 )
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center of ORNL and Environmental Protection
Agency.

forecasting exercise. Figure 2.1 shows this heterogeneity in per capita emissions both
across space and time.

2.3.4

Results

Here we present the results of forecast performance for out-of-sample forecasts from
each individual model and their linear combinations. The methodology for obtaining
out-of-sample forecasts are discussed in the Methodology subsection. We evaluate
each individual model and their linear combinations based on the their RMSFE. Then,
we compare the models and their forecast combinations to the specification with the
lowest RMSFE.
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The results of our empirical exercise for per capita CO2 emissions are presented
in Table 2.2 and for aggregate emissions in Table 2.3.

First, we note that

dynamic specification by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) and structural identity
specification by Yang and Schneider (1998) have smaller RMSFE than that of other
individual models. These two specifications perform better, in terms of RMSFE,
throughout the various forecast horizons. Second, all forecast averaging specifications
have lower RMSFE than those of Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) and Schmalensee et al.
(1998) specifications. Among all forecast combinations considered here, bias-corrected
average forecast by Issler and Lima (2009) performs better in terms of RMSFE. It
is well established that estimation of weights may be subject to bias, while equal
weights forecast, which does not require estimation of weights, perform well in many
applications (Clemen (1989), Stock and Watson (2004). It is not surprising that
bias-corrected average forecast that uses equal weights forecast, coupled with bias
correction term, performs well than the other combinations. Although model averaging
by Granger and Ramanathan (1984) has a lower RMSFE than bias-corrected average
forecast for one-year ahead (h=1) and two-year ahead (h=2) forecasts, for 3-year
ahead and greater forecast horizons it does worse than the latter.
In the last five columns in Table 2.2 we present the percentage differences in RMSFE
relative to the RMSFE from bias-corrected average forecast. For h=1, specifications
by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) and Yang and Schneider (1998) has 5 and
8 percentage points lower RMSFE. However, for h=2 through h=5, RMSFE for
bias-corrected average forecast is smaller by 9-19 percentage points than that for
Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) model. The improvement relative to Yang and
Schneider (1998) specification is modest, about 2-7 percentage points, for h=2 and
greater. Although bias-corrected average forecast was originally developed for cases
with large number of forecasts and long data, the method is shown to work well
in smaller number of models too (Issler and Lima (2009)). As noted in Issler and
Lima (2009), the use of equal-weights, while avoids estimating forecast weights, may
potentially increase bias. Bias-corrected average forecast corrects for bias present in
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Table 2.2: RMSFE for Per Capita CO2 Emissions
Forecast horizon:

Individual Models:
Holtz-Eakin & Selden
Schmalensee et al.
Aufhammer & Steinhauser
Yang & Schneider
Forecast combinations:
Equal-weighted forecast
Issler & Lima
Bates & Granger
Granger & Ramanathan

Difference (%):

h=1

h=2

h=3

h=4

h=5

h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=5

1.31
1.67
0.75
0.73

1.67
1.92
1.13
1.08

1.90
2.23
1.40
1.29

2.28
2.51
1.87
1.68

2.48
2.85
2.18
1.87

66
111
-5
-8

61
85
9
4

57
84
16
7

43
58
18
6

35
55
19
2

1.04
0.79
0.83
0.75

1.40
1.04
1.28
1.03

1.66
1.21
1.77
1.47

2.06
1.59
2.11
1.83

2.32
1.84
2.30
2.32

32
0
5
-5

35
0
23
-1

37
0
46
21

30
0
33
15

26
0
25
26

Note: Last 5 columns are percentage differences in RMSFE relative to that of bias-corrected average
forecast from Issler & Lima model specification.

Table 2.3: RMSFE for Aggregate CO2 Emissions
Forecast horizon:

Individual Models:
Holtz-Eakin & Selden
Schmalensee et al.
Aufhammer & Steinhauser
Yang & Schneider
Forecast combinations:
Equal-weighted forecast
Issler & Lima
Bates & Granger
Granger & Ramanathan

Difference (%):

h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=5

h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=5

408
525
235
230

526
609
358
342

600
708
446
414

729
795
600
541

797
907
702
606

63
110
-6
-8

59
84
8
3

53
81
14
6

42
55
17
5

34
52
18
2

327
250
261
237

443
331
407
329

530
392
565
472

660
514
674
586

745
595
740
741

31
0
4
-5

34
0
23
-0.6

35
0
44
20

28
0
31
14

25
0
24
25

Note: Last 5 columns are percentage differences in RMSFE relative to that of bias-corrected average
forecast from Issler & Lima model specification.

63

simple equal-weights forecast. When compared to simple average forecast, we can see
that bias-correction lowered RMSFE by 26-37 percent for h=1 through h=5.
The results for aggregate CO2 emissions in Table 2.3 are qualitatively similar to
reported results for per capita emissions. Model averaging methods considered here
all perform very well relative to specifications by Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) and
Schmalensee et al. (1998) throughout the various forecast horizons. Individual model
specification by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) and Yang and Schneider (1998)
have lower RMSFE for h=1 among all the individual models and their combinations.
However, for h=2 and greater their competitiveness decreases in RMSFE sense. Biascorrected average forecast proposed by Issler and Lima (2009) has lower RMSFE than
that for Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) specification. The difference in RMSFE
grows from 8 percent for h=2 to 18 percent for h=5. Relative to structural identity
equation by Yang and Schneider (1998), the improvement in forecast performance is
modest 3-6 percent.
Taken together, the reported results show that when the true data-generating
process is unknown, combining multiple forecast can significantly improve out-ofsample forecasts. Even with the small number of forecasts considered in this paper,
the advantage of combining multiple forecasts is clear. Improvement in forecast
performance from model combinations, while modest, is encouraging. There are many
different ways to combine individual forecasts and we only considered only a few of
those methods. Nonetheless, the results from combining forecasts show that forecast
combination may improve out-of-sample forecasts.
In addition to RMSFE comparisons, we also tested the out-of- sample forecast
accuracy using a method suggested by Diebold and Mariano (1995). We present
the test results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Diebold-Mariano test allows to compare two
models’ predictive ability and determine the best performing forecast. It tests whether
the forecast accuracy of two models based on mean-square error (MSE) or other
criteria, such as mean absolute error (MAE), are equal. Using out-of-sample forecasts
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Table 2.4: Out-of-Sample Tests for Aggregate Emissions based on MSE
MSE
h=1

h=2

h=3

h=4

h=5

Holtz-Eakin & Selden

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.003

Schmalensee et al.

0.042

0.023

0.000

0.000

0.000

Aufhammer & Steinhauser

0.488

0.149

0.003

0.001

0.000

Yang & Schneider

0.351

0.574

0.101

0.045

0.191

Equal-weighted forecast

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Bates & Granger

0.249

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Granger & Ramanathan

0.348

0.529

0.020

0.000

0.000

Individual Models:

Forecast combinations:

Note: The values are DM Test p-values. They test whether forecasts have the same predictive
accuracy using MSE. Small p-value means rejection of equal forecast accuracy.

Table 2.5: Out-of-Sample Tests for Aggregate Emissions based on MAE
MAE
h=1

h=2

h=3

h=4

h=5

Holtz-Eakin & Selden

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Schmalensee et al.

0.013

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Aufhammer & Steinhauser

0.82

0.334

0.003

0.000

0.000

Yang & Schneider

0.615

0.891

0.301

0.023

0.291

Equal-weighted forecast

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Bates & Granger

0.424

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Granger & Ramanathan

0.664

0.445

0.007

0.000

0.000

Individual Models:

Forecast combinations:

Note: The values are DM Test p-values. They test whether forecasts have the same predictive
accuracy using MAE. Small p-value means rejection of equal forecast accuracy.
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of aggregate emissions for 2005-2012, we compare the best combination forecast
(bias-corrected average forecast) to other forecasts. Using the MSE indicator, the
null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy are rejected for h=3 through h=5 period
ahead forecasts, except for Yang and Schneider (1998) specification. This means
bias-corrected average forecast outperforms majority of individual model forecasts and
the combined forecasts for h=3 and greater. Although bias-corrected average forecast
is better than the forecast obtained from Yang and Schneider (1998) specification and
has generally smaller RMSFE, Diebold-Mariano test failed to reject the null hypothesis
of equal forecast accuracy. For h=1 and h=2, forecasting accuracy from Auffhammer
and Steinhauser (2012), Yang and Schneider (1998), and the forecast combination
due to Granger and Ramanathan (1984) are not statistically different from that of
bias-corrected average forecast.
In terms of MAE, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecast
accuracy for bias-corrected average forecast and Yang and Schneider (1998) individual
model forecast. For h=1, forecasts from Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012), Yang
and Schneider (1998), Bates and Granger (1969), and Granger and Ramanathan (1984)
have similar predictive accuracy as that for bias-corrected average forecast. However,
for h=3 through h=5 bias-corrected average forecast has significantly better forecast
accuracy than the rest of the models.
Overall, the results confirm that the best combination model significantly
outperforms the majority of individual models in terms of MSE and MAE tests.
More importantly, the forecast accuracy tests show that the predictive performance of
the best performing individual model is not statistically significant than that of the
best combination.

2.4

Conclusion

Forecasting CO2 emissions is of particular importance in evaluating policies to address
CO2 emissions. Literature on forecasting CO2 emissions report forecasts that may
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differ significantly due to differences in modeling approaches and estimation techniques.
Despite the variations in modeling techniques, to the best of our knowledge, application
of forecast combination to CO2 emissions has not be been evaluated before. As the
empirical works show there can be gains from combining multiple forecasts. In this
paper we evaluate the relative forecasting performance of various individual models
and their linear combinations.
We find that among the class of forecast combinations considered in this paper, biascorrected average forecast outperforms individual models in RMSFE sense. Consistent
with forecast combination literature, the predictive accuracy of the best performing
individual model is not significantly different from that of the best performing forecast
combination. In particular, as the forecast horizon is increased the performance of
the best performing individual model worsens relative to that of the best performing
forecast combination (e.g. bias-corrected average forecast). Despite the relatively
small number of models considered in this paper, the results of forecasting performance
from forecast combinations are encouraging. Consistent with many empirical findings,
forecast combination that uses a variation of equal weights forecast may result in
improved forecast performance.
Our ability to increase the number of models to be combined is constrained by
the need to produce out-of-sample projections of right-hand-side variables. As models
to forecast emissions are continually being updated and perfected, combining better
individual forecasts may result in even more improved forecasting performance. For
example, the performance of forecast combination schemes can be further improved
by including more models in the combination scheme if they expand the information
set of existing models. But even with only four models used in the combination, the
advantage of forecast combination is clear: forecast combination, on average improves
the forecasting performance relative to that of the best individual forecast.
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